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INTRODUCTION

While all law is highly indeterminate, the difficulties of the law
governing federal administrative procedure have proved especially great. 1

1. One concise statement to this effect appears in Anton in Scalia, Judicial Deference
to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 ("Administrative law is not
for sissies ...."). For a clearer, but lengthier recent statement, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Comment, Legislative Reform of Judicial Review of Agency Actions, 44 DUKE L.J. Ill 0
(1995) (characterizing aptly the conclusions of Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy,
Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review ofAdministrativeDecisions, 44
DUKE L.J. 1051 (1995)):
Sidney Shapiro and Richard Levy['s] ... study of the history ofjudicial review of
agency action supports their conclusion that many of the legal doctrines applicable
to that process are indeterminate to an unusual degree-a court often can write an
opinion that reverses a major agency action as easily as it can write an opinion that·
upholds the same action. We do not see, and would not long tolerate, this degree
of indeterminacy with respect to the basic doctrines that govern other fields oflaw..
Imagine, for instance, a world in which the concepts of"offer" and "acceptance"
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To old hands, as well as new students, its materials present a shadowy
picture, which is the result of ambiguities that blur even its most basic
distinctions. 2
The persistence of ambiguities as to fundamental iss~es may seem
remarkable in light ofthe attempt at clarification made fifty years ago with
the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 3 However, the
ambiguities persist because they are built upon deep-seated and contradictory, impulses which are resistant to any sort of large-scale resolution.
At th~ center of these opposing impulses are, on the one hand, the desire
for broad· agency discretion and, on the other, a yearning for vigorous
judicial review of agency action in order to preserve the "rule of law" as
traditionally understood. 4 This opposition has led to conflicted and vague
doctrinal formulations of the scope of judicial review of agency action.
Section 706 of the APA, which specifies standards of review for a
variety of agency determinations, is a disorderly mess of 'ambiguous and
overlapping standards. 5 Examples of the confusion that resulted after the
enactment of the APA can be seen in the various judicial interpretations of
section 706's standards. These include the ambiguous rules set out in

are so malleable that parties who attempt to enter into a contract can do no better
than to predict that there is a 50% probability that a court eventually will hold that
their conduct created an enforceable contractual relationship. If such a legal
environment seems both unimaginable and intolerable, you are in a position to
empathize with a federal agency that must attempt to issue a major rule that is
subject to judicial review through application of the judicfal review provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Ifthe agency does everything it believes
that it must do to issue such a rule, the probability that the rule will be upheld is
less than 50%.
See also Thomas M. Susman, Now More than Ever: Reauthorizing the AdministrativeConforence, Reforming Regulation, and Reinventing Government, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 677,
682 (1994) ("Administrative procedure is ... often mundane, occasionally obscure, but
extremely complex.").
2. See infra notes 4-3 I and accompanying text (describing lack of clarity inherent in
administrative law).
3. Act of June I I, 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 55I-559, 70I-706 (I994)).
4. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, HeightenedScrutinyofthe Fourth Branch:
Separation ofPowers and the Requirement ofAdequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, I 987
DUKE L.J. 387, 389 (concluding that liberal tradition, or traditional court-centered rule of
law culture, is based on separation of powers and due process considerations and implies
meaningful review of agency action, contr~ting this tradition with regime of practical
necessity, expertise, and efficiency which requires deferential review).
5. Pierce, supra note I, at II 13.

HeinOnline -- 10 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 181 1996

182

THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:179

Chevron 6 attempting to specify the deference that a reviewing court owes
an agency's interpretation of its own enabling ace They also include the
confusing standards, as described in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe, 8 governing judicial review of a wide variety of agency decisions
concerning fact and policy.9
Separate from the issue of which verbal standard of review is appropriate
for which sort of agency determination is that of the intensity of review that
each standard demands. Overton Park's well-known, schizophrenic (if not
fully contradictory) statement of the appropriate intensity of arbitrary and
capricious review makes the discretion/rule-of-law tensions clear: "Certainly, the Secretary's decision is entitled to a presumption of regularity. But
that presumption is not to shield his action from a thorough, probing,
in-depth review." 10
The notion of discretion itself appears mysterious and contradictory in
the APA. The statute exempts from review matters which are "committed
to agency discretion,"\\ but provides that there shall be judicial review for
abuse of agency discretion in a presumably large category of cases. 12 This
apparent contradiction has received a great deal of attention from students
of administrative law generating extended and heated debates. 13 The two

6. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).
7. !d.
8. 401 u.s. 402 (1971).
9. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,415-17 (1971)
(attempting to explain how review to determine if agency has considered relevant factors
relates to review for arbitrariness and capriciousness, and how latter relates to review for
errors of law determination or factfinding).
10. !d. at 415 (citation omitted).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1994). This section provides in part: "This chapter applies,
according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that-(1) statutes preclude judicial
review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." !d.
12. !d. § 706. Section 706 defines the scope of review as follows:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action. The reviewing court shall-(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld
or unreasonably delayed; and (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be-(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; ....
!d.
13. Raoul Berger maintained that all abuse of discretion is correctable by courts at the
instance of those with standing under traditional criteria, while Kenneth Culp Davis maintained the existence of a small, but significant, class of exercises of discretion by agencies
reviewable only in the political branches. For their exchange-amounting to four attacks and
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proviSions manage peaceful coexistence only because "discretion" in
"committed to agency discretion" has been accorded a meaning different
from that of the same word in "abuse of discretion." 14 Even then, the
Court's development of the notion of agency discretion in each of the two
catagories has not been particularly satisfactory. 15
Nearly as fundamental as the doctrinal ambiguity generated by the
discretion/rule-of-law opposition, is the lack of a clear line separating the
categories of adjudication and rulemaking. These categories blur as they
are used within each of the somewhat separate schemes of the Constitution
and the APA. The constitutional distinction between adjudicative and
legislative-style proceedings is fuzzy, although clear at its core. 16 The

four responses over roughly two years, spilling out of the pages of one journal to another,
and then to a third-see Raoul Berger, AdministrativeArbitrarinessand Judicial Review, 65
COLUM. L. REv. 55 (1965);4KENNETII C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 28.16
(Supp. 1965); Raoul Berger, AdministrativeArbitrariness: A Reply to Professor Davis, 114
U. PA. L. REv. 783 (1966); Kenneth C. Davis,AdministrativeArbitrariness-A Final Word,
114 U. PA. L. REV. 814 (1966); Raoul Berger, AdministrativeArbitrariness-ARejoinder
to Professor Davis' 'Final Word', 114 U. PA. L. REV. 816 (1966); Kenneth C. Davis,
AdministrativeArbitrariness-APostscript, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 823 (1966); Raoul Burger,
AdministrativeArbitrariness,A Sequel, 51 MINN. L. REV. 601 (1967); Kenneth C. Davis,
AdministrativeArbitrariness/s Not Always Reviewable, 51 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1967).
For a discussion of other scholarly views, see Ronald M. Levin, Understanding
Unreviewability in AdministrativeLaw, 74 MINN. L. REv. 689, 694-702 & nn.S0-53 ( 1990).
14. The Supreme Court has distinguished reviewable discretion from that which is in
the APA 's technical sense"Committed to Agency Discretion" by concluding that the special
hallmark of the latter is that there is no law to apply. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410;
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832-35 (1985); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599-600
(1988).
15. See Levin, supra note 13, at 702-34 (criticizing the current Supreme Court
definition of the "Committed to Agency Discretion" category). For a more nuanced and
convincing vision of the content of unreviewable action under the "Committed to Agency
Discretion" category, see pages 734-81 of Levin's article. See also Harvey Saferstein,
Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of Committed to Agency Discretion, 82 HARV. L.
REv. 367 (1968).
16. In United States v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 245-46 (1973), the
Court explained:
While the line dividing [legislation and adjudication] may not always be a
bright one [Supreme Court decisions dealing with the requirements of due process]
represent a recognized distinction in administrative law between proceedings for
the purpose of promulgating policy-type rules or standards, on the one hand, and
proceedings designed to adjudicate disputed facts in particular cases on the other.

***

... [In this rate making proceeding the Commission' sorder was] applicable across
the board to all of the common carriers.... No effort was made to single out any
particular [one] for special consideration based on its own peculiar circumstances.
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APA's differentiation appears in definitions which do not clearly distinguish
those two categories even though they are intended to have separate fields
of application and distinct procedural consequences. 17 The APA's
differentiation between adjudicative and legislative action has proved
intelligible only by means of reading common sense and constitutional
tradition into the statute. 18

!d. at 245-46.
17. Section 551(4) of the APA states in pertinent part:
'[R]u1e' means the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law
or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an
agency and includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages,
corporate or financial structures or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities,
appliances, services or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting,
or practices bearing on any of the foregoing.
5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1994) (emphasis added). Section 551(6) reads, irr full, as follows:
"'order' means the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative,
injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making but
including licensing ...." !d.
Everything that happens in the world of which applicability can be predicated is either
of"general or particular applicability" or some combination of the two. As far as we know
everything that happens in the universe has only '·future effect." Taken literally,§ 551(4)
results in every administrative decision producing a rule.
For example, an SEC enforcement action against a particular participant in securities
transactions is of particular applicability and future effect. This is most obviously true if
the agency issues a coercive order requiring the defendant to refrain from certain practices
in the future, but it is also true if the agency orders reparations. The effect of the order is
in the future gauged from the time of its issuance. Despite this, any respectable
administrative procedure expert could identify such a proceeding as an adjudication, because
the language of section 551(4) is not taken seriously in this respect. Instead, it is infused
with meaning from common law and constitutional law sources.
18. Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872,875-76 n.4 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978):
The determination that the EPA must make under§ 316 of the FWPCA is not a
rule because it is not "designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or
policy." 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). Rather the EPA must decide a specific factual
question already prescribed by statute. Since the determination is not a rule, it is
an order. 5 U.S.C. § 551(6). The agency process for formulating an order is an
adjudication. 5 U.S.C. § 551(7). Therefore, § 554 rather than§ 553 of the APA
is the relevant section. The same result is dictated because § 316(a) of the
FWPCA is a licensing, 5 U.S.C. § 551(9), since it results in the granting or denial
of a form of permission. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(8). A license is an order. 5 U.S.C.
§ 551(6).
!d. The first sentence of the above-quoted passage is misleading. The determination, which
is admittedly an adjudication, certainly can be brought to implement, interpret, or prescribe
law or policy, for example, see SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), and NLRB v.
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The APA's distinction between formal and informal proceedings
(whether rulemaking or adjudication) is drawn in a reasonably clear way in
terms of the procedural attributes of each variety of proceeding. 19 The
statute is not at all clear, however, as to how to determine which real world
proceedings are entitled to which sort of procedural treatment. 20 To

Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974), but only as long as the agency is willing to use
the new rule to dispose of the specific case before it, for example, see NLRB v. WymanGordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
The language of§ 551(4) (as opposed to the general notions of adjudication and
legislation normally read into that section) seems to have its greatest impact in presumptively
precluding prospective agency adjudication, or use of an adjudication as a vehicle for
announcement of a new rule which the court does not apply to the matter at hand but
reserves for future cases. Some have seen the announcement of prospective rules in
adjudication as opposed to the notion that only rulemaking is "offuture effect." Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 217 (1988) (Scalia J., concurring).
19. This is certainly true with. respect to formal proceedings, whether of the rulemaking
or adjudication variety. Sections 556 and 557 of the APA specify the procedures in detail.
As to informal proceedings, section 553 spells out, with reasonable clarity, the limited
procedures available to interested parties. Some of these are subject, however, to a range
of interpretation. For example, the requirement. that parties be permitted to participate by
comment has been read to make comment the equivalent of a very limited paper crossexamination as to the most crucial basis on which the agency relies in issuing a rule.
20. The APA's provisions for rulemaking and adjudication state that proceedings are
formal if the agency's organic act "require[s] [them] to be made on the record after
opportunity for agency hearing ...." 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 554(a), 554(c)(2) (1994). This
might naturally seem to require a search, not simply for specific language in an agency's
enabling act, but for. the "meaning" of the words in the act that require a hearing. The
question asked for each agency proceeding would be whether Congress intended sufficient
formality to trigger any additional procedures in§§ 556 and 557. Obviously, such an inquiry
yields as much uncertainty as any interpretive enterprise.
·
Whether correct or not, the Supreme Court has imposed clarity on the APA as it
pertains to rulemaking. In Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. at 237-38, the Court either
reduced, or very nearly reduced, the triggers of§§ 556 and 557 procedures to the presence
of the words "on the record" or their synonyms. Rarely, if ever, will the structure of the
statute, the importance of its subject, the circumstances surrounding its enactment or other
aspects of its legislative history trigger formal procedures in the absence of such words.
The Florida East Coast decision has not completely removed the original ambiguity
of the statute. Some lower federal courts treat it as inapplicable to administrative
adjudications, thus allowing a more .wide-range consideration of factors to determine
formality. For example, the First Circuit, in Seacoast Anti-Pollution League, 512 F.2d at
876, found that:
At the outset we reject the position of intervenor PSCO that the precise words ·'on
the record" must be used to trigger the APA. The Supreme Court has clearly
rejected such an extreme reading even in the context of rule making under § 553
of the APA. Rather, we think that the resolution of this issue turns on the
substantive nature of the hearing Congress intended to provide.
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compound the difficulties, at least for those new to administrative law, at
times, courts and commentators use the word "legislative" to indicate that
a proceeding is informal/ 1 while more ordinarily it is used to mean a
process which makes general rules. 22 This strange first usage is highlighted by one of many passages in the Supreme Court's Overton Park opinion:
"The Secretary's decision to allow the expenditure of federal funds to build
1-40 through Overton Park was plainly not an exercise of a rulemaking
function. . .. The hearing [was] nonadjudicatory, quasi-legislative in
nature. . . :m
Perhaps the most interesting of recent judicial difficulties and scholarly
debate stems from the current, nearly contradictory, view of the APA
provisions for informal rulemaking. 24 These provisions require agencies
which promulgate legislative rules to follow informal, but still somewhat
onerous, notice and comment procedures. Exempted from such requirements, however, are two varieties of "publication rules": policy statements
and interpretative rules?5

!d. (citations omitted).
21. See infra note 23 and accompanying text (explaining Overton Park's use of"quasilegislative" to describe informal adjudication).
·22. For recognition that this is the usual legal usage, see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
899 (6th ed. 1990). For examples of this usage in administrative law cases, see United
States Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 571-72
(1973) (reasoning that "Congress intended to deprive the Civil Service Commission of
rulemaking power in the sense of exercising a subordinate legislative role in fashioning a
more expansive definition of the kind of conduct that would violate the prohibition against
taking an active part in political management or political campaigns."); RLC Indus. Co. v.
Commissioner, 58 F.3d 413, 413-17 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Rulemaking, the quasi-legislative
power, is intended to add substance to the Acts of Congress, to complete absent but
necessary details .... Adjudication, the quasi-judicial power, is intended to provide for the
enforcement of agency ... regulations on a case-by-case basis.., (quoting 3 STEIN ET AL.,
ADMINISlRATIVE LAW § 14.01, at 14-2 (1994))).
23. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414-15 (1971)
(emphasis added).
24. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994) (explaining informal rulemaking procedure).
25. Section 553(b) ofthe APA states that, "Except when notice or hearing is required
by statute, this subsection does not apply-(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of
policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice; ... :· 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)
(1994). See PETER L. SlRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISlRATIVE JUSTICE IN TilE
UNITED STATES 157 (1989) (applying term "publication rules" to interpretative rules and
policy statements); see also Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J.
1463, 1467 (1992) (describing "publication rulemaking" and its processes).
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Courts have never clearly distinguished the two sorts of publication rules
from each other. 26 At one time, the distinction between these two
categories, on the one hand, and legislative rules, on the other, seemed
relatively firmly grounded in two features of the former: Publication rules
were said to be tentative views of the agency, required to be reconsidered
each time the agency applied them to particular circumstances, and were
also subject to more intensive scrutiny on judicial review. 27
Given the real possibility of Chevron deference for publication rules as
well as legislative rules, 28 the distinction between legislative and publication rules becomes tenuous in many, 29 though not all, 30 cases because

26. Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818F.2d 943, 946(D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating
that "[t]he distinction between legislative rules and interpretative rules or policy statements
has been described at various times as 'tenuous"' but also drawing no distinction between
latter two categories).
27. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm 'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38-39 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
28. See Reno v. Koray, 115 S. Ct. 2021, 2026-27 (1995) (suggesting at least some
deference under Chevron for an interpretive rule); Health Ins. Ass'n of America v. Shalala,
23 F.3d 412,424 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1095 (1995) ("We have often
applied Chevron deference to interpretive rules without comment .... Because the parties
have agreed that Chevron deference is appropriate h~re, we have no need to address the
scope of deference to an interpretive rule."); Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v.
Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 181-82 (3d Cir. 1995) (according complete Chevron deference to
interpretation of statute contained in letter from high agency official). But see id. at 185,
188 (Nygaard, J., dissenting) (mustering impressive case law support against Chevron
deference for non legislative rules); accord, e.g. Robert A. Anthony, Which Interpretations
Should Bind the Courts, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 55-58 (1990) [hereinafter Anthony, Bind the
Courts]; KENNETII C. DAVIS & RICHARDS. PIERCE, JR., ADMINIS1RATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 6.3, at 235-36 (3d ed. 1994). This matter is truly unresolved. The Supreme Court
in Reno seemed to hedge on full Chevron deference. 115 S. Ct. at 2026-27. Still earlier
Supreme Court cases gave Chevron deference to interpretations in an opinion letter and an
amicus brief. See, e.g., Mead v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714, 721-22 (1989).
29. See CommunityNutritionlnst., 818 F.2d at 945-46, in which the court agreed with
characterizations of the distinction between policy statements (and probably interpretative
rules) and legislative rules as"tenuous," "blurred," "enshrouded in considerable smog," and
"baffling;"' but attempted, unsuccessfully, to clarify this by describing legislative rules as
binding norms. See American Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d
1106, 1108-12 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (demonstrating that court in Community Nutrition Inst. left
law nearly as fuzzy as it was found).
30. Some rules are clearly legislative. As the court in American Mining stated:
Accordingly, insofar as our cases can be reconciled at all, we think it almost
exclusively on the basis of whether the purported interpretive rule has "legal
effect", which in turn is best ascertained by asking (1) whether in the absence of
the rule there would not be an adequate legislative basis for enforcement action or
other agency action to confer benefits or ensure the performance of duties, (2)
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presumably the differential judicial scrutiny has disappeared or greatly
narrowed. 31 The notion that a reviewing court can effectively require an
agency to view its own publication rules as especially tentative seems
unlikely from a psychological viewpoint. Given the agency's investment
in its decisions, an adopted policy is likely to possess a great deal of inertia,
making it resistant- although not immune-to real reconsideration. 32
From a _legal viewpoint, as long as the agency provides a formal opportunity for reconsideration, it seems difficult for courts to enforce the requirement of actual redeliberation.
It is for these reasons that efforts to draw clearer distinctions between
legislative rulemaking and publication rules have floundered-leading to the
brink of contradiction. At present, one could argue that as a result of
forces described above, many rules which are legislative in effect both are,
and are not, required to be promulgated in accordance with the APA's
rulemaking procedures. 33

whether the agency has published the rule in the Code of Federal Regulations, (3)
whether the agency has explicitly invoked its general legislative authority, or (4)
whether the rule effectively amends a prior legislative rule. If the answer to any
of these questions is affirmative, we have a legislative, not an interpretive rule.
American Mining Congress, 995 F.2d at 1112.
31. It is possible, however, that even if Chevron is applicable to policy statements, the
latter would be scrutinized more than legislative rules. Scrutiny under Chevron's second
prong reasonableness test could be seen as variable, requiring a stronger agency showing to
justify a policy than to defend a comparable legislative rule. /d. at 1111-12.
32. Even if formally subject to reconsideration, policy statements clearly have
formidable inertia. See Panhandle Producers & Royalty Owners Ass'n v. Economic
Regulatory Admin., 847 F.2d 1168, 1175 (5th Cir. 1988) (requiring agency to consider
arguments against application of policy statement, but recognizing that statement could be
relied on to shift burden of proof as to entitlement to exemption).
33. Additionally, consider the notion that an agency pays the price of submission to
strong scrutiny once-either up-front, by means of public participation in legislative
rulemaking, or at the back end of judicial review, by means of greater court scrutiny of
interpretative rules or policy statements. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41
DUKE L.J. 1490, 1491 (1992). If neither the up-front notice and comment scrutiny, nor the
rear-end intense judicial review scrutiny is exacted, the distinction between publication rules
and legislative rules will be seriously imperiled. But see American Mining Congress, 995
F.2d at 1111-12 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Williams, J.) (contending that Chevron's step two can be
adjusted to provide stricter scrutiny for publication rules).
All of this leads to hard questions about whether the coverage of informal, but
relatively intense, rulemaking procedures are determined by the agency's choice of a label
or by the more limiting, but still often nearly metaphysical, degrees of "binding" effect of
the particular pronouncement. Again, contradictory policy preferences are responsible for
this ambiguity. On the one hand, courts want to give effect to the APA's clear requirement
that rules with legislative force must be made by means of relatively stringent ~;~gency
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It may seem surprising that, fifty years after Congress enacted the APA,
so many fundamental ambiguities remain. On reflection, however, there
should be no surprise, given the continuing claims that strong and opposing
values still plausibly make in administrative law culture. As a result, large
scale solutions are unlikely. Instead, the law of administrative procedure
usually reaches compromises between these opposing values in a finegrained, tentative, and highly-contextualized way-often within the confines
of a particular case or narrowly defined set of circumstances. There is
almost a Goldilocks quality to the law governing administrative procedure:34 some resolutions of contradictory impulses are adjudged too much
of this, or of that, or sometimes just right, but rarely are these conclusions
generalized into even relatively firm legal doctrines.
This Article discusses one of the many problems of ambiguity and
contradiction under the APA. After Overton Park/ 5 this problem typically
has been described as one concerning the nature of the "record" on which
a court will review informal agency action. 36 On this fiftieth anniversary
of the APA, the foundations of federal regulation are under attack. 37 As
a result, the set of decisions to which the APA applies may soon be greatly
reduced and the statutory procedures for those which remain may be
changed. Consequently, a discussion limited to one technical feature of the
current law of administrative procedure may be equivalent, for a neo-New
Dealer, to fiddling while Rome bums or, for a proponent of the "Contract
with America," to fiddling while Rome is scaled back to more harmonious
proportions. Still, it is a safe prediction that, when the dust settles on

procedures, a requirement provided as a counterweight to the delegation oflegislative power
to agencies and the resulting attenuation of political accountability. On the other hand,
courts want to encourage agencies to clarify regulatory requirements at the earliest possible
stage, even before they are ready to promulgate rules that they are fully prepared to have
bind them.
34. See Sieck v. Russo, 869 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1989).
35. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
36. See id. at 420 ("[R]eview is to be based on the full administrative record that was
before the Secretary at the time he made his decision."); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142
(1973) ("[T]he focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already
in existence ...."). See also Stephen Stark & Sarah Wald, Setting No Records: The Failed
Attempt to Limit the Record in Review of Administrative Action, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 333
( 1984) (contending that Overton Park requirement of review on administrative record has
seriously eroded). See infra notes 155-248.
37. For a description and assessment of many proposals for change, see. Cass R.
Sunstein, Legislative Foreword: Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit
State, 48 STAN. L. REv. 247 (1996).
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whatever renovation there will be, what remains of the past will be
substantial, including many of the familiar problems.
Among these problems will be that of determining the appropriate
agency procedures for a variety of agency actions which affect diverse
interests in varying ways and the scope of judicial review of these
procedures. The focus of this Article-a determination of the appropriate
record for judicial review of informal agency action-is an important part
of those issues.
The portions of the Overton Park opinion which bear on this question
brim with contradictions similar to the others discussed above:
[The hearing in before the agency]. .. is not designed to produce a record that is
to be the basis of agency action-the basic requirement for substantial-evidence
•
revtew
.... 38
Although a regulation requiring formal findings was issued after the Secretary had
approved the route, a remand to him is not necessary as there is an administrative
record facilitatingfull and prompt review of the Secretary's action . .. 39
It is necessary to remand this case to the District Court for plenary review of
the Secretary's decision. That review is to be based on the full administrative
record that was before the Secretary at the time he made his decision.~·

Pressing the contradiction further, the Overton Park Court did not just
permit a reviewing court to demand that an agency provide a reviewing
court with such a record, it required the agency to do so. 41 Beyond this,
the Court required that judicial review of informal proceedings be confined
to a scrutiny of that record-precisely the requirement that the APA
explicitly imposes on judicial review of agency formal proceedings.42
While judicial scrutiny must be confined to such a record and must be
deferential, as the Overton Park passage, quoted above, makes clear, the
same passage also requires "a thorough, probing, in-depth review."43 The
ambiguity of this standard is not only generated by the contradictory claims
of the notions of rule of law and administrative discretion, but it is
sufficiently great to permit courts to decide many like cases in contradictory
ways.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added).
!d. at 403 (emphasis added).
!d. at 420 (emphasis added).
!d.
5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (1994).
Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415.
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Some matters are clear, however. Not only must a reviewing court
understand the material it analyzes in the record, but according to the Court
in Overton Park, a reviewing court must assure itself that the agency has
given adequate consideration to the "relevant factors. "44 Will this mandate
sometimes conflict with the "On the Record Rule," pressing a court to look
at information which was not before the agency when it made the decision
under review? Here, the contradiction seems epistimological. Can a record
establish its own completeness? Based on a plausible definition of
"relevant factors," how can a court determine what was not considered by
an agency solely by looking to a record of what was? If it cannot do so,
how can a court both follow the On the Record Rule and engage in relevant
factors analysis?
While the lower federal courts generally have followed the On the
Record Rule and its notions of deference, economy and bounded rationality,
the apparently contradictory requirements of performing meticulous review
while wearing blinders occasionally have caused them to recognize
exceptions to the rule going beyond those which Overton Park indicated
were to be the exclusive ones. 45 · One particularly influential opinion,
Asarco, Inc. v. EPA, 46 concluded that occasionally the On the Record
Rule, as articulated in the Overton Park opinion, must give way to the
other demands of that opinion, which require a reviewing court to
determine whether an agency has considered the relevant factors:
[I]t is both unrealistic and unwise to "straightjacket" the reviewing court with the
administrative record. It will often be impossible, especially when highly technical
matters are involved, for the court to determine whether the agency took into
consideration all relevant factors unless it looks outside the record to determine
what matters the agency should have considered but did not. The court cannot
adequately discharge its duty to engage in a "substantial inquiry" if it is required
to take the agency's word that it considered all relevant matters. 47

Allowing a court to take evidence to consider the existence of possible
relevant factors not developed in the record and not so clearly relevant as

44. !d. at 416.
45. See infra notes 204-12 and accompanying text for examples of cases recognizing
some exceptions to the On the Record Rule, in addition to those announced by the Supreme
Court in Overton Park as exclusive exceptions. For claims of great erosion of the On the
Record Rule, see Steven Stark & Sarah Wald, supra note 36. For arguments that the Stark
and Wald claims were and have proved extravagant, see infra notes 171-246 and
accompanying text.
46. 616 F.2d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 1980) (allowing direct court of appeals review of
EPA decision).
47. !d.
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to be judicially noticeable seems a violation of Overton Park's requirement
that administrative action be sustained or struck down on the record of
information actually before the agency at the time of its decision. 48 This
seems especially true when combined with Vermont Yankee's vision of
informal proceedings as minimalist.49 Below, this Article offers a way of
harmonizing the two Overton Park requirements-review on the record and
review for agency consideration of relevant factors-which seems more
plausible than that of the Asarr:o court. On this interpretation, the
requirement of relevant factor review is seen in a narrower way that, except
for matters subject to judicial notice, requires no excursion beyond the
administrative record. This view better complies with the Supreme Court's
current vision of informal proceedings. 5° In the Conclusion, however, this
Article argues that the Court's current vision is in need of serious
reconsideration by the legislature rather than by the Court itself.
Some lower federal court opinions have recognized a second exception,
permitting introduction of evidence to explain to the court the technical
background against which to judge the rationality of agency action. In the
words again of the Ninth Circuit, in Association of Pacific Fisheries v.
EPA: 51
To a limited extent, therefore, the post-decision studies can be deemed a
clarification or an explanation of the original information before the Agency, and
for this purpose it is proper for us to consider them .... We do not think it is
appropriate, however for either party to use [that information] as a new
rationalization either for sustaining or attacking the agency's decision .... [i)t is
inappropriate to rely on the specific conclusions of those studies to show that the
[agency's action was) not the product of reasoned decision making ....52

48. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 419.
49. See infra notes 223-31 and accompanying text.
50. Id
51. Association of Pacific Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1980). In
this case, the extra-record information not allowed to supplement the record was also postdecision information. /d.
52. Id at 811-12 (emphasis added). Judicial consideration of studies subsequentto an
agency decision may be a double violation of Overton Park's requirements that a court
should (1) focus on what was available to the agency at the time of its decision, and (2)
focus only on what the agency actually considered, a subset of the first requirement. A case
such as PacificFisheriespresents the clearest violation of the second requirement. This is
for the obvious reason that what was developed after an agency decision obviously was not
considered at the time of the decision. In some cases purporting to use relevant factors
analysis, it is unclear whether the court is bringing in factors that were not included in the
record sent by the agency to the reviewing court, but actually considered by the agency and
made part of the record in the Overton Park sense. There is no such ambiguity with a postdecision study because it was not part of the agency record in any sense.
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On careful examination, the use for which the Ninth <:;;ircuit allows
introduction of information not originally before the agency ~ntradicts the
limits it attempts to place on the use of such information. : Background
·information is apparently legally irrelevant if it is clear, a priori, that it
cannot make a difference to the outcome of review. But, if such information can make a difference in the determination of arbitrariness, this means
· that it could tum a decision which would pass arbitrary and capricious
review on the original record into one that does not pass on an augmented
record, or, conversely, it could convert one which failed into one which
passes. This ~eems a violation of the Overton Park's On the Record Rule.
This exception, too, is discussed below. While somewhat strange, an
exception for technical background information, when carefully limited, can
be harmonized with Overton Park's requirements. 53 This Article concludes that such information can be introduced into evidence before a
reviewing court and be permitted to make a difference in the result, but
only if it exerts its influence over a court's decision invisibly, never
appearing as an explicit part of the court's opinion. 54
Claims for erosion of the On the Record Rule have extended well
beyond the two summarized above, and are discussed at length below.
Based partly on the occasional deviations discussed above, the only piece
of general scholarly commentary concerning the On the Record Rule seems
to have seriously exaggerated the extent to which that rule has been eroded
by the lower federal courts, finding not just the two exceptions discussed
above, but six others as well:
·
[A]n examination of the concept of review on the record in the courts surprisingly
reveals that the doctrine no longer exists in any coherent form, although judges and
analysts pretend that it is still viable. Faced with the difficulty of defining the
record in specific cases, courts have developed so many unwritten exceptions to
the doctrine of record review, that industrious advocates now can introduce any
evidence they choose in cases reviewing informal administrative action. 55

This Article criticizes the general thrust of that commentary either as a
description of the law when it was written, or as a predictor of what is now
current practice. The On the Record Rule of Overton Park has not been
riddled out of existence by exceptions created by the lower federal courts.
Some of the exceptions urged in the commentary are not exceptions at all.
Another seems limited to a specific statutory scheme. This Article

53. See infra notes 247-54 and accompanying text.
54. !d.
55. Stark & Wald, supra note 36, at 335-36.
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demonstrates that the rule has been largely safe not only from latter day
erosion by lower courts, but that it also has been largely safe from the two
rather limited exceptions recognized originally by the Supreme Court in
Overton Park itself. When analyzed, these original exceptions seem to
have an interesting, but minuscule potential set of applications.
Finally, in its Conclusion, this Article offers a brief critique of the
current regime ofjudicial review of informal administrative action, offering
some suggestions for reform.
I.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION: REVIEW BASED ON
A RECORD VERSUS DE NOVO REVIEW

A.

Overton Park: The Supreme Court's Conception of Judicial Review
of Agency Action

In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.. Vo/pe, 56 the Supreme
Court endorsed one of a number of possible models of judicial review of
informal administrative action, the most common and least procedurally
onerous way an agency may take action under the APA. 57 In many, but
not all respects, that conception was a diluted version of the model of
judicial review of formal administrative action, a relatively rare, procedurally onerous method of agency decisionmaking. 58 That formal model, in
turn, was based, largely but not entirely, on another: the system for
appellate review of judicial trials. 59

I.

The Model of Review for Formal Administrative Action

In takingformal action, an agency, like a trial court, may consider only
evidence properly admitted in the proceeding before it and subject to

56. 401 u.s. 402 (1971).
57. Compare the rigorous civil trial-like requirements of the formal provisions of the
APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (1994), with the Jess onerous requirements for informal
rulemaking and the nearly nonexistent procedural requirements for informal adjudication.
/d. §§ 553, 555. See P~nsion Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990) (indicating no APA requirement permitting notice of issues in informal adjudications or of right
to participate therein).
58. The APA mandates the procedures to follow for review of formal administrative
action. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-57 (1994). These procedures, triggered by sections 553 and 554
when the enabling statute requires the agency action to be made "on the record," allow a
party to present oral or documentary evidence, including rebuttal evidence, as well as oral
cross-examination. /d. § 556(d).
59. See infra notes 60-65.
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rebuttal by opposing parties, often by means of cross examination. 60 In
such formal proceedings, an agency.is obligated to explain its decision in
a manner similar to the way that trial courts are required to explain the
results of non-jury trials-by explicitly connecting the facts found with the
applicable law. 61
Review of formal agency decisions by the courts in many ways
resembles review of a trial court by an appellate court. In appellate review
of a trial court's decision, the focus is on the law, the evidentiary record,
and, to some extent, on the trial court's explanation or opinion. Evidence
not considered by the trial court normally cannot be considered by an
appellate court. 62 If newly discovered evidence or post-trial events warrant
a change in a result, it is not the appellate process which initially affects the
change. The appellate focus is on the correctness of the trial court's result
based on the facts before the court at the time it reached its decision and

60. An agency must explain its formal decisions with a statement of findings of fact and
law, which illustrates the basis for its decision. 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1994); see also Pension
Benefit Gauranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 653-55 (1990).
61. After a non-jury trial, a federal district court must make specific findings of fact
and of law to support its final decision. FED. R. CIV. PRO. 52(a); see Lora v. Board of
Educ., 623 F.2d 248, 251 (2d Cir. 1980); 9A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2579 at 537-48 {2d ed. 1994).
62. Supplementation of the record with information not originally before the lower
court ordinarily will not be allowed at the appellate Iev,el. FED. R. APP. PRO. IO(e). See
9 JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 210.08 at 10-46, 58 (2d ed. 1995 &
1995-96 Supp.). For one particularly clear, recent statement see Dakota Indus., Inc. v.
Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 988 F.2d 61, 63 (8th Cir. 1993). "Generally, an appellate court
cannot consider evidence that was not contained in the record below." /d. See also Federal
Ins. Co. v. Halprin Supply Co., 12 F.3d 1270, 1284 (3d Cir. 1993) ("This is because: [t]he
only proper function of a court of appeals is to review the decision below on the basis of
the record that was before the district court.") (quoting Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon, 807
F.2d 1150, 1165 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070 {1987) (alteration in quote)).
Exceptions to these propositions are made in extremely compelling circumstances.
Supplementation of the record has been permitted only when the "interest
of justice" require consideration of evidence not in the record. Cases in which
supplementation of the record has been permitted generally involve inmates or
similarly situated petitioners who claim egregious constitutional violations. Those
courts allowing supplementation emphasized the mistaken exclusion of documents
from the record and that the party made no conscious decision to omit the
documents.
Gardner v. Chrysler Corp., No. 91-1496-PFK, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18015 at *22-*23 (D.
Kan. Nov. I, 1995) (citations omitted) (quoting Millerv. Benson, 51 F.3d 166, 168 (8th Cir.
1995) (quoting Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 988 F.2d 61, 63 (8th Cir.
1993).
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on the law. 63 To undo the result of a trial based on new evidence requires
an extraordinary showing on a motion to reopen made in the trial court. 64
Thus, judicial review of formal administrative proceedings resembles the
standard judicial review model by its focus on the correctness of the
agency's decision at the time it was rendered-looking only to evidence in
the record to undercut or support the agency decision reviewed.
It differs, however, in one particularly important way. An appellate
court can disagree with a trial court's legal justification for the result that
it reached on the factual record, but affirm nonetheless, by substituting
other acceptable legal reasoning, as long as the factual premises of that
reasoning find adequate factual support in the record before the court
below. 65
As stated with great clarity in the Chenery lf 6 case, review of formal
administrative action is almost always different from appellate review of a
trial court in this respect: the agency's decision must be sustainable based
solely upon the reasoning it employed at the time of its decision.61

63. As for limitation to facts properly before the lower court, see supra note 62. As
to the law, however, matters are different. All courts, including appellate courts, must apply
the law existing at the time the court disposes of the matter before it. United States v.
Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 103, IIO (1801). For a discussion of this point, see
Gordon G. Young, Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts' Jurisdiction and
Processes: United States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 WIS. L. REv. 1189, I240 & n.238.
64. Additional evidence for a jury trial may only be heard on a grant of a motion for
a new trial, while additional evidence for a court trial may be heard on either a motion to
reopen or a motion for a new trial. FED. R. CIR. PRO. 59( a). The granting of such motions
is discretionary but typically requires a substantial showing to justify the measure. FED. R.
CIR. PRO. 60(b)(2). AG Pro., Inc. v. Sakraida, 5I2 F.2d I41, 143 (5th Cir. 1975); In re
Tuchrello, 43 B.R. 93, 96 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. I984); see also FLEMING JAMES, JR. &
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § I2.I4 at 676-80 (3d ed. I985); II CHARLES A.
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2859 at 30I-I0 (2d ed. I995).
65. NLRB v. PIE Nationwide, Inc., 923 F.2d 506, 5I7-I8 (7th Cir. I99I) (contrasting,
in dicta, power of court reviewing lower court's judgment with lack of power in PIE to
reach decision on grounds not employed by agency whose decision is reviewed).
66. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. I94 (I947).
67. !d. at I96. This requirement antedates Chenery. See National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190,227 (1943); Tagg Bros. v. United States, 280 U.S. 420, 444-45
(1930). The material required to support the agency's original rationale implicitly defined
in National BroadcastingCo. was later adopted by the Court in Chenery. Compare National
Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 190-97 with Chenery, 333 U.S. at 207. For a clear discussion
of the development of this rule before enactment of the APA, see Susannah T. French,
Judicial Review ofthe AdministrativeRecord in NEPA Cases, 8I CAL. L. REV. 929, 933-36
(1993). The requirement of decision only on the record made before the agency was
adopted clearly by the APA with respect to formal Proceedings. 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (1994)
(making "[t]he transcript of testimony and exhibits, together with all papers and requests
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If the agency's decision is not sustainable on the agency's original record
based on its rationale at the time of decision, the reviewing court may not
sustain the action on other reasoning it finds acceptable even though that
reasoning seems well-supported by facts in the administrative record.
Instead, it must strike down the agency action and remand for further
consideration. 68
The reasons for this follow from the prevailing assumptions of
administrative law. An agency is created and staffed to exercise expert
discretion in assessing evidence, making -predictions, and formulating
policy. 69 Judicial deference has long' extended, to some degree, even to

filed in the proceeding ... the exclusive record for decision").
68. Chenery, 332 U.S. at 196-97. See also Florida Power & Light Co. v Lorian, 470
U.S. 729, 745 (1985) (describing propositions in question as fundamental principles of
judicia\ review of agency action).
69. In Chenery, 332 U.S. at 196, the Court stated:
When the case was first here, we emphasized a simple but fundamental rule
of administrative law. That rule is to the effect that a reviewing court, in dealing
with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is
authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds
invoked by the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is
powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to
be a more adequate or proper basis. To do so would propel the court into the
domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency.
/d.
The first Chenery case, SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943) [hereinafter
Chenery II] is also instructive on this point:
The grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged are those upon
which the record discloses that its action was based. In confining our review to
a judgment upon the validity of the grounds upon which the Commission itself
based its action, we do not disturb the settled rule that, inreviewing the decision
of a lower court, it must be affirmed if the result is correct although the lower
court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason. . . The reason for this
rule is obvious. It would be wasteful to send a case back to a lower court to
reinstate a decision which it had already made but which the appellate court
concluded should properly be based on another ground within the power of the
appellate court to formulate. But it is also familiar appellate procedure that where
the correctness of the lower court's decision depends upon a determination of fact
which only a jury could make but which has not been made, the appellate court
cannot take the place of the jury. Like considerations govern review of
administrative orders. If an order is valid only as a determination of policy or
judgment which the agency alone is authorized to make and which it has not made,
a judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment.
For purposes of affirming no less than reversing its orders, an appellate court
cannot intrude upon the domain which Congress has exclusively entrusted to an
-- administrative agency.

HeinOnline -- 10 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 197 1996

198

THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:179

an agency's interpretation of its enabling act_1° A court that tells an
agency its decision was wrong based on the latter's legal reasoning from
the record, but right based on other available legal reasoning, cannot be
certain that the agency would have read the law or chosen to exercise its
authority in that way. 71

Id. at 87-88.
70. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984). While the usual view
is that Chevron signals a significant increase in deference, some have suggested that it
simply restates the law without intensifying it. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in
the Supreme Court: Highlightsfromthe Marshal/Papers,23 ENVTI... L. REP. 10,606, 10,613
(1993). Chevron itself suggests that any change it contemplated was not large scale:
We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an
executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations "has
been consistently followed by this Court whenever decision as to the meaning or
reach of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting policies, and a full
understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given situation has
depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to
agency regulations."
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (citations omitted).
To lend weight to its view, the Chevron Court cited SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194 ( 1947). In Chenery, the Court concluded that the agency, while acting under the
statutory "fair and equitable" standard, had developed a new principle of fairness: that
corporate insiders often should not be permitted to reap all benefits of trading in their own
companies' stock during a reorganization. ld at 204-09. The Court's view of the standard
of judicial review for agency lawmaking under an enabling act is as follows:
The scope of our review of an administrative order wherein a new principle is
announced and applied is no different from that which pertains to ordinary
administrative action ....

***

The Commission' sconclusion here rests squarely in that area where administrative
judgments are entitled to the greatest amount of weight by appellate courts. It is
the product of administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities of the
problem, realization of statutory policies ... It is the type of judgment which
administrative agencies are best equipped to make and which justifies use of the
administrative process. Whether we agree or disagree with the result reached, it
is an allowable judgment which we cannot disturb.
Id (citation omitted).
71. All of this explains why a reviewing court cannot rerationalize the result of an
agency proceeding as it can with the result of an inferior court, but it does not explain why
the focus is on the set of reasons that the agency found decisive at the time it reached its
decision. Why limit the expert agency to reasons actually decisive? Why not allow it to
substitute, during the course ofjudicial review, a satisfactory post-decision rationale for the
true contemporaneous, but possibly defective, initial rationale? While practically speaking,
this limitation rarely may make a positive difference, it seems an attempt to provide
incentive for an agency to conduct its original deliberations with care. How often such
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These principles for formal proceedings are derived from a federal
common law of administrative procedure recognized and applied by the
courts well before the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. 72 While
Overton Park makes clear that this law is viable today, it does not make
clear whether it is seen as existing along side the APA or as implicitly
incorporated in that statute's provisions for judicial review. 73
2.

Overton Park's Formalization of Informal Proceedings

a. Some Background Concerning Informal Proceedings Under the APA

Some background is necessary in order to understand the shifting nature
of informal proceedings under the APA and to understand Overton Park's
role in increasing their formality. The Administrative Procedure Act's
recognition of a category of informal administrative action can be
understood in a variety of ways. First, from a public choice perspective,
the APA might be seen as a compromise of a myriad of interests asserted
by diverse groups who influenced the legislative process. 74 Some of these
groups would be helped and others injured by intensifying procedural rights
and judicial review in a wide variety of agency contexts. 75 Second, the
APA could be understood as based on public values, specifically as an
attempt to provide only those protections whose economic and social costs
are justified by the benefits they provide.
From this second perspective, informal proceedings are a set of
proceedings by a wide variety of agencies on widely differing subjects, but
possessing a common characteristic. That characteristic is the conclusion .

incentive is decisive, however, is a matter of conjecture.
72. See supra note 68.
73. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1970) (citing
Chenery) (not permitting agency to offer new justifications-described as "post hoc"
rationales-but rather requiring agency to provide either contemporaneous or later
explanation of agency's original reasons).
74. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), the Court
reflected on the Act's significance:
In 1946, Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act, which as we
have noted elsewhere was not only "a new, basic and comprehensive regulation of
procedures in many agencies," but was also a legislative enactment which settled
"long-continued and hard-fought contentions, and enacts a formula upon which
opposing social and political forces have come to rest."
/d. at 523 (citation omitted) (quoting Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40
(1950)).
75. /d.
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that all of these are matters as to which more formal procedures and
exacting judicial review are not cost-justified. On this view, if agency
proceedings are thoughtfully aligned to the formal or the informal set, then
informal proceedings presumably would be either matters in which little
was at stake, or matters in which additional procedures would yield little
extra fairness, or both. This presumption follows the familiar and
analogously apt procedural due process balancing calculus. 76
Circumstances at the time of the APA's drafting made a division
between the formal and informal categories on fairness grounds seem more
natural than it does today. Given the shape of the regulatory .landscape at
that time, it was much easier to sort proceedings into two groups in terms
ofthe importance ofthe interests at stake: (1) matters touching upon private
rights protected to some degree by due process,77 and (2) other interests

76. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), offers the Supreme Court's most
recent general formulation of the balancing calculus:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interestthat will be affected
by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the [g]overnment'sinterest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id.. at 335.
Matthews is not the first case to recognize the appropriateness of a balancing in the
procedural due process context. Due process, particularly in its application to adjudicatory
procedure, has long been recognized to involve balancing to compromise public interests
with private rights. See North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 31920 (1908) (considering competing claims of owners of private property summarily destroyed
and public interest in eliminating probable danger, and concluding no hearing was necessary
before destruction). In Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163
(1951), Justice Frankfurter explained:
The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the manner in
which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available alternatives to the
procedure that was followed, the protection implicit in the office ofthe functionary
whose conduct is challenged, the balance of hurt complained of and good
accomplished-these are some of the considerations that must enter into the
judicial judgment.
!d. at 163 (Frankfurter, J ., concurring).
Because the APA is not clear as to which proceedings are entitled to formal
procedures, the most rational form of allocation would involve balancing the benefits of
formality against the costs.
77. The Court has described the APA as a response in large part to the "[m]ultiplication
offederal administrative agencies and expansion of their functions to include adjudications
which have serious impact on private rights ...." Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 36-37;
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in fidelity to law, short of recognized rights. The former largely covered
the interests of business, although a smaller set of matters involving
individual liberty was also included.78 While substantive due process no
longer provided business interests meaningful protection from regulation
itself, 79 procedural fairness in the making and application of regulations
.remained an important value. 80
Procedural due process, as augmented by provisions of the APA,
provided certain protections in these cases where property, and, less
frequently, liberty, were at stake. These protections ensured that agency
action which reduced the value of business operations was authorized by
statute and that the agency acted only on a defensible view of the facts, in
the determination of which the business had meaningful input.
Most other interests, however, went largely unprotected, or, rather, the
agency was seen as the adequate and sole protector of·a generalized public
interest, including those particular segments of the public with very strong
interests in an agency's performance of its statutory duties. 81 For the most

see also Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 824 (1978) (extendingpresumptionofformality beyond adjudications affecting classical
liberty and property rights to all significant and non-routine agency adjudications, thus
implicitly balancing, at some level of generality, what is at stake to private interests and
value of additional procedures against their cost to public interest).
78. Some agencies, particularly those dealing with immigration and military authorities,
had enormous powers to make decisions affecting liberty interests. Although these decisions
were often subject to judicial review, the reviewing courts were required to give great
deference to many crucial agency determinations. See United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S.
253 (1905) (refusing to allow de novo review of agency decision excluding alien who
claimed citizenship); Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946) (stating in dicta that
review of draft board decision underlying military induction notice was unavailable except
for claims that agency acted without jurisdiction).
79. Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking state maximum hour
law as depriving workers and employers of liberty without due process of law) with West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 ~.S. 379 (1937) (upholj:ling state minimum wage law whose
substance was challenged under due process) and United ~tates v. Carotene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144 ( 193 8) (upholding federal law barring sale of certain products whose substance
was challenged under due process). In Carotene Products, the Court seemed to abjure the
power to strike down ordinary economic legislation as a violation of due process (or equal
protection) unless wildly and obviously irrational on the face of the legislation. For a
general discussion of this shift, see GEOFFRY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 786811 (2d ed. 1991).
80. See Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 36-40 (describing concerns about administrative
fairness which, along with other concerns, led to APA's passage).
81. This proposition is best illustrated by shifts in the law of standing starting in the
1940's but gaining real momentum in the 1970's. The primary criterion for standing was
a chissicallegal-interest of the sort also protected by procedural due process. For example,
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part, even these specially interested segments of the public were accorded
no meaningful procedural rights before an agency and were likely to lack
standing to challenge final agency action in court. 82

Competitor B, though actually injured, would not have had standing to challenge the
government's grant of a license or other competitive advantage to his Competitor A,
although arguably granted in violation of a statute governing the circumstances in which
such grant would be appropriate. Denial of standing was based on the premises that (I) no
one has a right to have government protection absent some particular constitutional or legal
source, and (2) that the limits in the statute granted no private rights but were there to
protect the public interest-an interest with which the agency could be trusted. Consequently, Competitor B was viewed as no more a serious candidate for standing than some
otherwise uninterested person who abstractly wanted agencies to obey statutory limits. See
Cass Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432,
1436 n.18 (1988) (concluding that such person would have been treated as "bystander"
instead of player).
This slowly began to change with cases such as FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,
309 U.S. 470 (1940), Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942), and
Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
Each of these cases awarded someone in Competitor B's position standing to challenge an
advantage granted by the government to Competitor A. These cases were based on a
reading of each statute in issue as granting competitors standing as "private Attorney
Generals." Ickes, 134 F.2d at 704. It was not until Association of Data Processing Service
Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), that the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994), was read as
presuming that anyone whose interest was arguably among the zone of interests specially
protected by a statute would have standing to sue. The new view was based on a number
of elements, including ( 1) a belief that interests other than traditional property interests-such as an interest in observance of environmental laws-were entitled to some
protection; (2) a less worshipful view of agency expertise; and (3) a genera\ distrust of
government based on the fear, in particular, that agencies often were controlled by the very
businesses they were created to regulate. These views made it more crucial that interested
non-agency actors could challenge agency action to assure regulation in the public interest.
See PETER L.S1RAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINIS1RATIVE LAW 464-65, 113338 (9th ed. 1995); Sunstein, supra at 1434-45. This phenomenon manifested itself not only
in a liberalization of standing before courts, but also of "standing" to participate in agency
proceedings to various degrees. S1RAUSS ET AL., supra at 464-77.
These changing expectations also manifested themselves in increasingly activist
judicial review of agency action, often at the request of those who were newly granted
standing. This took two forms. First, heightened review of informal agency action was
sanctioned by Overton Park itself. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 420 (1970). See infra notes 108-25. Second, courts required agencies _to use
procedures beyond the minimum required by the APA in order to develop a better record
on which a court might assess the rationality of agency action. This second development
was halted by the court in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519,
548 (1978).
82. See supra note 81 (discussing criteria for standing to participate in judicial review
of agency action).
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It was proceedings involving these lesser interests, in which the agency
was seen as an appropriate sole representative of the public interest, which
defined the original set of informal administrative action. Indeed, this
accounts for the confusing fact that such action-whether rulemaking or
adjudicative-historically has been called "legislative" in a secondary sense
of that word.
One reason for this strange usage of "legislative" was that, when neither
liberty nor property rights were at stake, the agency was permitted to gather
information to ground its action in virtually any way it wished-a freedom
reminiscent of that which is enjoyed by a legislature or one of its
committees. Because there were no formal proceedings into which
evidence had to be admitted, there was no restriction on ex parte contacts.
Consequently, commissioners could consult with industry representatives
without hearing the opposing views or even notifying the opposing
interests. 83 Such action also resembled legislation in another respect. ·On
judicial review of issues resolved by the agency, other than issues of law,
courts subjected the agency's decision to an "arbitrary and capricious"
scrutiny which resembled the toothless rational basis test applied to

'83. In The Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. Boyd, 244 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1965), the court
stated that:
The final contention advanced in behalf of the plaintiff is that the record of
the hearings before the Board does not sustain the validity of the regulation or the
need therefor. This contention seems to be based on a misconception of the nature
of a rule-making proceeding. Rule-making is a legislative process. It is neither
judicial, administrative, nor quasi-judicial. An agency performing a legislative
function need not proceed on evidence formally presented at hearings. It may act
on the basis of data contained in its own files, on information informally gained
by members of the body, on its own expertise, or on its own views or opinions.
It is not necessary for the regulatory agency to cause to be submitted at hearings
evidence that would support its rule-making decisions. The regulation ultimately
promulgated need not be sustained by evidence. The purposes of rule-making
hearings are to give an opportunity to interested parties to submit data and facts,
and to present their views. Consequently, the Court does not review a record of
such hearings as it does records in judicial or quasi-judicial proceeqings. Such
hearings are analogous to hearings conducted by [c]ongressional [c]ommittees. An
Act of Congress need not be supported by formal evidence introduced at hearings.
/d. at 892. This view changed in the D.C. Circuit between Overton Park and Vermont
Yankee. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 51-57 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1978) (finding ex parte contacts improper in informal
rulemaking); see also Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Report to the Select Committee on Ex Parte
Communications in Informal Rulemaking Proceedings, 30 ADMIN. L. REV., 377, 379, 380
n.8 (1978) (discussing whether Home Box Office survived Vermont Yankee).

HeinOnline -- 10 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 203 1996

204

THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:179

determine the rationality of ordinary legislation challenged as violating
substantive due process. 84
Passage of the APA in 1946 provided some new, but still relatively
limited, procedural protections for parties interested in informal agency
rulemaking. 85 In such proceedings, an agency was required to propose
rules publicly, and to receive and consider comments from all interested
persons. 86 The effect of this requirement was limited in four ways. First,
courts treated the requirement that the agency consider comments as
hortatory. 87 Second, in deciding to issue a rule, an agency could rely on
material never exposed to the comment process. 88 Third, certain rules,
including interpretive rules and policy statements, were exempted even
from the requirements of notice and comment. 89 Fourth, agencies
possessed an almost unlimited latitude to avoid the APA's rulemaking

84. See Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1935)
(holding that agency did not need to make specific findings to support promulgated rule,
much like legislature need not make such findings, and finding reasons for special deference
to agency conclusions not fully explained). The passage of the APA requirement of a
"concise general statement," 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) ( 1994), did not significantly affectthe Pacijlc
States Box & Basket rule because the APA provision was not read to compel specific
findings to justify a ru)emaking. ATIORNEY GEN., MANUAL ON TilE APA 32 (1947). Case
law before Overton Park suggests that if a court finds the basis and purpose of a rule
obvious, a supporting statement is not required. Hoving Corp. v. FTC, 290 F.2d 803 (2d
Cir. 1961 ). Overton Park was the first step in Supreme Court case law toward searching
review of agency action. By 1983, in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 ( 1983), the Court expressly rejected any similarity between the rational
basis review applied to legislative action and the arbitrary and capricious standard of review
for agency
action. The Court strongly suggested that it would be less deferential to an agency's actions
taken to fulfill its statutory mandate. /d. at 43 n.9.
85. 5 u.s.c. § 553 (1994).
86. /d.
87. Before Overton Park's requirements of (I) review on the agency record; (2) offer
of an explanation of a rational connection between an agency's statutory authority, the
record, and its decision; and (3) thorough review of those materials, it was impractical to
require serious consideration. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. This
requirement gained further momentum after Overton Park when the D.C. Circuit required
that the record or an agency's explanation respond to any significant comments apparently
undercutting the rationality ofits decision. Portland Cement Ass'n y. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d
375, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
88. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing agency's ability to gather
information through ex parte contacts).
89. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1994).
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requirements by using specific adjudications as vehicles for announcing
general rules. 90
Stripped down as they were, rulemaking proceedings, as described above,
were still more procedurally exacting than informal adjudication. For the
latter, the APA provided few, if any, procedural protections. 91
Thus, in both informal rulemaking and informal adjudications, an agency
operated more like a legislature or a legislative committee than a court.
This limited restrictions model-limited both in terms of agency procedure
and intensity of judicial review-was the model of informal agency action
employed by the courts during the early years of the APA. 92
Over the years, the prevailing conception of informal action edged away
from the limited restrictions end of the continuum. This change was driven
by new varieties of regulation which affected, in important ways, interests
of citizens not traditionally recognized by the legal system, typified by
environmental protection legislation.93 It was also characterized by a
general reappraisal of the desirability of allowing an agency to be the sole
champion of the public interest in non constitutional cases, concerned with
the integrity of government, particularly the executive branch and agencies
captured by regulated interests.94 It was driven in some respect by an
emerging skepticism about the existence of an intelligible public interest
having some meaning other than the desires of the victors in interest group
warfare. As new important, but nonproprietary, interests appeared, and as
confidence in agencies waned, the requirements for informal action moved
somewhat toward those required for formal proceedings, affording more
procedural protections in actions before the agency and more intensive
judicial review.
Even at the time of greatest movement toward formalizing informal
proceedings, in the early to mid 1970's, differences between the two types

90. SEC v. Chenery, Corp., 323 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947) (indicating that agency's
choice ofrulemaking or adjudication as vehicle for making policy lies primarily in agency's
discretion).
91. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1994).
92. See Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1971, 24 ADMIN. L. REv.
299, 306 (1972} (describing Overton Park as delineating new procedure between formal
proceedings and no procedure at all). For a fuller version of the Schwartz quotation see text
accompanying infra note 108.
93. Sunstein, supra note 81, at 1441-42 (commenting on judicial enlargement of
standing in variety of new regulatory settings); Schwartz, supra note 92, at 306 (commenting
on judicial enlargement of procedures required in variety of new regulatory settings).
94. STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 81, at 464-65; Sunstein, supra note 81, at 1443-44.
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of proceedings remained striking. 95 Moreover, since that time, there has
been some movement back toward less formality. 96
The time of greatest formalization of informal proceedings was the
period between the decision of Overton ParlC7 and the decision in
vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, a case which severely
limited, but did not entirely roll back, the process of formalization. 98
During this period, informal proceedings and court review followed
somewhat formalized features, some stemming from Overton Park and
some even antedating it slightly. 99
During those years, the notion of participation by comments in
rulemaking was expanded to require an agency to make available for public
comment any factual material on which it would significantly rely in
justifying its rule. 100 This is, essentially, a diluted, non-oral form of cross

95. Compare the requirements offormal proceedings under 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-57, which
resemble those for civil trials in courts, with the even more demanding requirements for
informal action devised between Overton Park and Vermont Yankee, described infra notes
100-04.
96. Except for some small set of truly exceptional cases, Vermont Yankee ended the
lower federal courts' practice of occasionally requiring agencies to conduct their informal
proceedings with more safeguards than the minimum required by the Constitution, the APA,
or more specific statutes. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519,
524, 543 (1978). However, Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. The LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633
(1990), seemed to protect Overton Park's apparent innovations, including (1) review on a
record, (2) meaningful agency explanation of its decision, and (3) careful rationality review,
as explications of the APA's judicial review requirements. !d. at 654.
97. See Schwartz, supra note 92, at 306 (describing Overton Park as delineating new
procedure that works in between formal proceedings and no procedure at all).
98. 435 U.S. 519, 524, 543 (1978) (prohibiting courts, except in most compelling
circumstances, from requiring agencies to provide procedures going beyond minimum
required by Constitution, APA, or more specific statute).
99. While Overton Park was, at the highest level, an endorsement, extension and
clarification ofthe trend toward formalization, the trend had its origins slightly earlier in the
United States Courts of Appeals. See Automotive Parts and Accessories v. Boyd, 407 F.2d
330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (requiring that agency's explanation of its action be reasonably
detailed, although this partially may have been result of special requirements of enabling
act). See PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN ANDBYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 478-79
(8th ed. 1986), including Automotive Parts in the vanguard of the "hard look" movement
toward intensification of judicial scrutiny of informal agency action.
100. Portland Cement Assoc. v. Ruchelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir. 1977). See also
Neil D. McFeeley, Judicial Review ofInformal AdministrativeRulemaking, 1984 DUKE L.J.
347, 353 nn.47-48 (1984).
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examination. Some courts did require oral cross-examination. 101 Some
courts imposed a ban on ex parte contacts, thereby making it likely that all
information considered by the agency, whether deemed significant or not,
would be available to the parties. 102 Such information would be ayailable,
if not for an additional round of comments, then at least for consideration
on judicial review. 103 Additionally, the largely unenforceable requirement
that agencies consider comments was translated into the real requirement
that an agency, in explaining its decision, respond to any significant
comment which challenged its rationality. 104
Both rulemaking and adjudication were subjected to the requirement that
an agency explain its decision in some reasonable fashion, and that the
explanation rationally connect the decision with the record. 105 In an
informal proceeding, the record was the material before the agency when
it reached its decision. 106 Finally, as to the intensity of judicial review,
the Supreme Court began to require serious scrutiny of informal agency
action. 107

b. Overton Park's Role in Formalization
While the lower federal courts already had begun to suggest an
intensifYing of procedures in informal proceedings, it was the Supreme
Court itself which most dramatically signaled real change. As Bernard
Schwartz said in his commentary shortly after the case was decided:

101. The Court in Vermont Yankee read the opinion of the court below as ordering cross
examination in an informal rulemaking and reversed on grounds that courts should not, on
their own authority, augment the procedural requirements of the APA. Vermont Yankee, 435
U.S. at 524, 541-43. See also International Harvester Corp. v. Rucklehaus, 478 F.2d 615,
630-31 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (affirming power to order cross-examination in informal rulemaking
but declining to do so in instant case).
102. United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519,536-43 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 51-59 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
103. This flows from Overton Park' sand Camp v. Pitts'sdefinition of record for judicial
review as everything that the agency considered in reaching its decision. Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1970); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
I 04. United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 ("It is not in
keeping with the rational process to leave vital questions, raised by comments which are of
cogent materiality, completely unanswered."); Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 392-94.
105. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 417-20.
106. !d. at 420.
107. See infra note 125 and accompanying text (quoting portions of Overton Park
describing judicial review as "probing" and "in-depth").
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Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe is the first Supreme Court decision
to deal with a new type of administrative procedure that is halfway between the
traditional, formal regulatory procedure and no procedure at all. The technique
referred to has developed as the focus of concern in our administrative law and has
begun to shift from the older areas of regulatory administration (covered by the
formal APA requirements) to newer areas which reflect the assumption of new
functions of government. 108

It is important to note precisely how Overton Park did and did not
endorse a more formal model for informal proceedings. Commentators
often note that informal proceedings are distinguished from formal
proceedings precisely by virtue of the fact that the latter are decided "on
the record" and the former are not. 109 The Supreme Court has mandated
that, at least in rulemaking proceedings, the presence or absence in an
enabling act of the words on the record, is normally a dispositive indicator
of whether the APA' s formal trial-type provisions are triggered. 110
One of Overton Park's formalizing innovations is to make clear that, in
informal proceedings which are not on the record in the technical sense of
the APA, there is, nevertherless, a record in another sense. 111 Certainly,
by definition, there is no precisely defined procedural record comprising all
evidence admitted and subject to cross examination. 112 According to
Overton Park itself, the record in an informal proceeding is all the material
that the agency considered in reaching its decision. 113 Commentators have
criticized this notion as making it hard to determine exactly what the record
is. 114 For present purposes, the argument is not concerned with the
wisdom of basing review on such an informal record. Rather, the key point
is that this was the Overton Park view of informal records and it continues
to be the Supreme Court's view. 115

108. Schwartz, supra note 92, at 306.
109. See 5 U.S. C.§§ 553(c), 554(a), (c)(2); seealso United States v. Florida East Coast
Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 234 (1973).
110. /d. at 234-38.
111. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 418-19; WALTER GELLHORN ET AL., ADMINISlRATIVE LAW 824 (7th ed. 1979); J. Skelly Wright, Commentary: Rulemakingand Judicial
Review, 30 ADMIN. L. REV. 461, 464 (1978).
112. 401 U.S. at 420.
113. /d.
114. William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J.
38, 59 ( 1975).
115. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420 (stating simply that "review is to be base'd on
the full administrative record that was before the Secretary at the time he made his
decision"). The Court never specifically defines the term "record." Contrast this vague
account with the notion of record in formal proceedings described in 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-57
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The significance that the Court accorded this different sort of record,
once identified, is exactly that which is generally accorded to more formal
and identifiable records produced in formal decisions. Any specific
factfinding, crucial to an agency's decision, must be adequately supported
by the evidentiary record which was before the agency when it acted} 16
If the purely legal reasoning is adequate ("the statute permits us to ban
dangerous p'roducts"), then the decision stands or falls depending on
whether the factual record adequately supports the factual portion ("this is
a dangerous product"Y 17 of the agency's actual reasoning to its conclusion
("therefore it is banned"). If the court decides that the statute and record
supports a second reason for banning the. drug (ineffectiveness, for
example), it nevertheless cannot uphold the ban on a basis not relied on by
the agency to support its decision. Rather, it would have to remand to
allow for initial agency consideration of this possible alternative
ground. 118

(1994). See also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 139-42 (1973) (noting that "[t]he entire
administrative record was_placed before the court .... The focal point for judicial review
should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially
in the reviewing court." This statement made it reasonably clear that what is placed before
court by agency is not necessarily a~ministrative record for review in Overton Park sense).
At one point in its opinion in Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorian, 470 U.S. 729
(1985), the Court casually refers to the record for review as "the record the agency presents
to the reviewingcourt." /d. at 744 (emphasis added). In another portion of its opinion, the
Lorian Court calls for remand if "the record before the agency does not support the agency
action." !d. (empha!)is added). This clearly is the Overton view and remains so today. It
is not in keeping with the remainder of the Overton Park opinion or with subsequent
Supreme Court and lower court opinions to believe that an agency can withhold important
information which it considered but which undercuts its decision from a reviewing court.
I I6. See supra note 69 (quoting from Chenery). Compare this treatment with Over_ton
Park, 401 U.S. at 4I9-20.
I I 7. Of course, this usage of "factual" is to cover predictions and many other hard to
classify judgments about the world as opposed to judgments about the meaning oflegal texts
and traditions.
II8. In Camp, the Court stated:
[I]n the present case there was contemporaneous explanation of the agency
decision. The explanation may have been correct, but it surely indicated the
determinative reas~n for the final action taken: the finding that a new bank was an
uneconomic venture in light of the banking needs and the banking services already
available in the surrounding community. The validity of the Comptroller's action
mu$t, therefore, stand or fall on the propriety of that finding, judged, of course, by
the appropriate standard of review. If that finding is not sustainable on the
administrative record made, then the Comptroller's decision must be vacated and
~lie matter remanded to him for further consideration.
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Overton Park also fonnalizes infonnal proceedings in another way. It
requires that an agency adequately explain its decision, even though the
court did not explain the meaning of "adequate." 119 There are several
provisions of the APA which might be viewed as requiring that some
greatly stripped-down version of a judicial opinion accompany informal
agency decisions, in order to provide an explanation. 120 The Overton
Park Court cites none of these provisions, but rather indicates that an
explanation is necessary to facilitate judicial review. 121 The Court makes
clear that if such an explanation is not supplied along with the decision, or
provided shortly thereafter, the actual reasoning of the agency can be made
a subject of inquiry in the judicial review proceedings. 122 Note however,
that the Court here applies the fonnal model to infonnal proceedings. The
-issue is not how an agency can most convincingly rationalize its decision
during judicial review, but whether its actual reasons for acting at the time
it decided the matter can withstand scrutiny. 123
Finally, rounding out the picture of how Overton Park fonnalized
infonnal proceedings, it legitimated and perhaps intensified a trend toward
.increased judicial scrutiny of agency action, particularly infonnal agency
action, under the arbitrary and capricious standard. The standard was a

/d. at 143. Furthermore, in Florida Power & Light Co. v Lorian, 470 U.S. 729 (1985), the

Court found:
If the record before the agency does not support the agency action, if the agency
has not considered all relevant factors, or if the reviewing court simply cannot
evaluate the challenged agency action on the basis of the record before it, the
proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for
additional investigation or explanation. The reviewing court is not generally
empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to
reach its own conclusions based on such an inquiry.
/d. at 744.
119. The only guidance the Court does provide to this question is that "post hoc"
rationalizations of agency actions are "an inadequate basis for review." Overton Park, 401
U.S. at 419.
120. For example, the APA provides that an agency denial of a party's request must
include a "brief statement of the grounds for denial." 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1994).
Furthermore, after promulgating new rules, an agency must "adopt a concise general
statement of their basis and purpose." /d. § 553(c).
121. 401 U.S. at420. See also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633
(1990) (grounding Overton Park's rules in the requirements for effective judicial review
implicit in APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706).
122. The Court states that ·'it may be that the only way there can be effective judicial
review is by examining the decisionmakers themselves." Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420.
123. Presumably this is reflected in the Court's rejection of post hoc rationalizations.
Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 419.
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weak one, calling for scrutiny resembling that applied to ordinary economic
acts of Congress challenged for violating substantive due process. 124
Overton Park moved beyond this earlier view to require real scrutiny:
Even though there is no de novo review in this case and the Secretary's [decision]
does not have ultimately to meet the substantial-evidence test, the generally
applicable standards of§ 706 require the reviewing court to engage in a substantial
inquiry. Certainly, the Secretary's decision is entitled to a presumption of
regularity. But that presumption is not to shield his action from_ a thorough,
probing, in-depth review. 125

II.

THE TWO EXCEPTIONS OVERTON PARK RECOGNIZED TO ITS OWN
"ON THE RECORD RULE"

While Overton Park generally required that judicial review be confined
to scrutiny of the administrative record, it recognized exceptions. 126 In
these two circumstances, the Court permitted some form of de novo judicial
review, meaning that the validity of an order or regulation would be
determined based upon a record at least partially made before the reviewing
court. 127 The Court described these exceptions as follows: "First, such de
novo review is authorized when the action is adJudicatory in nature and the
agency factfinding procedures are inadequate . . . . [Second,] there may be
independent factfinding when issues that were not before the agency are
raised in a proceeding to enforce non-adjudicatory agency action ...." 128
The Court cited no caselaw as authority for this proposition, but rather
referred to a House of Representatives Report 129 accompanying the APA
and to Louis Jaffee's treatise. 130 The Committee Report certainly supports
such a suggestion, however, it is more easily read as suggesting that all
informal administrative action should be reviewed not on the record before
the agency, but de novo, on a record made in the reviewing court's
proceedings:

124. PETER L. SlRAUSS ET AL, supra note 81, at 602-03 (citing Pacific States Box and
Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935}, as example of old standards of arbitrary and
capricious review resembling toothless rational basis standard applied to most economic
legislation to determine if their substance comports with due process).
125. 401 U.S. at 415 (citations omitted).
126. !d.
127. !d.
128. !d.
129. H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
130. LOUIS JAFFEE, JUDICIAL CON1ROL OF ADMINISlRATIVE ACTION 359 (1965).
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In short, where a rule or order is not required by statute to be made after
opportunity for agency hearing and to be reviewed only on the [formal] record
thereof, the facts pertinent to any relevant questions of law must be tried and
determined de novo by the reviewing court respecting either the validity or
application of such rule or order-because facts necessary to the determination of
any relevant question of law must be determined of record somewhere and, if
Congress has not provided that an agency shall do so, then the record must be
made in court. 131

This clearly supports Nathaniel Nathanson's claim that all informal
agency action was meant to be reviewed de novo. 132 But across-the-board
de novo review of informal agency action is antithetical to the On the
Record Rule of Overton Park, and to the spirit of other contemporaneous
Supreme Court cases. 133 It is difficult to tell whether Overton Park rests
on a true judicial mistake about the original intention underlying the APA
or upon a dynamic statutory interpretation aimed at modernizing the
statute. 134 What is clear after Overton Park is that, currently, we have a
system in which the On the Record Rule is the rule and de novo review is
the exception.
If the Supreme Court has, in effect, stood the original meaning of the
APA on its head in this respect, does the legislative history provide any
help in understanding why? Perhaps it does, by making clear the sorts of
cases in which the legislature thought that this sort of de novo review
would operate. Examined closely, the legislative history reveals that the
emphasis was on the small set of cases in which informal administrative
action could harm constitutional rights.
The focus of the legislative history was on due process. In cases not
involving liberty or property, the absence of a record posed fewer
difficulties for two reasons stemming from the nature of informal
proceedings at that time, as discussed above. First, aside from those few

131. H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. 45 (1946); S. REP. No. 752, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1945).
132. Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Probing the Mind ofthe Administrator: Hearing Variations
and Standards of Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedures Act and Other
Federal Statutes, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 763-65 n.8 (1975). See also Stephen F.
Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and
Empirica1Analysis,42 U. CHI. L. REv. 401,419-20 n.76 (1975) (advocating de novo review
when substantive validity of agency rule turned upon resolution of factual claim).
133. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978); United
States v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
134. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. DYNAMIC STATUTORY IN1ERPRETATION (1994)
(arguing throughoutthat statutory interpretation ought to consider post enactment events and
values).
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whose classical property or liberty rights were impinged by informal action,
the remainder of affected persons were much less likely to possess standing
under the more rigid standing requirements prevailing at the time. 135
Second, the nearly totally deferential standard of review of informal
proceedings which prevailed before Overton Park136 suggested that
production of a record normally would be a waste of time, because a
reviewing court was almost certain to uphold the challenged agency despite ·
what the record revealed. 137
A change in the regulatory landscape since 1946 has caused the APA to
be reinterpreted. Attempts have been made to apply its provisions to a set
of problems for which the APA was not designed. 138 The older style
regulatory pattern pitted the agency as sole representative of the public
interest against individual property and liberty interests. 139 SEC and
immigration orders provide an example of each of these, respectively. As
newer forms of regulatio'n, such as environmental regulation, were devised,
a middle ground of interests was recognized in which a party had
administrative and judicial standing even without a Fifth Amendment
liberty or property interest. 140 With both the side effects of regulation or
non-regulation raising the stakes for broad .spectrums of the citizenry, and
"agency-capture theory" suggesting that agencies alone could not be trusted
with the public interest, courts began to recognize public interest group and
even individual standing. 141
Real judicial scrutiny of agency action, at the request of those affected,
seemed in order, where the stakes were as serious as, for example, safe
nuclear waste disposal or the disruption of a public park (as in Overton
Park)} 42 In Florida East Coast Railway, however, the Court rejected an
interpretation of the APA which would have viewed many of these
proceedings as formal and subject to the APA's trial-like provisions! 43

135. See Sunstein, supra note 8 I, at I 434-45 (discussing narrow view of standing as tied
only to classical legal concept, invaded by regulation and not by beneficiaries of regulatory
statutes claiming under-enforcement by agencies).
136. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
137. /d.
138. Schwartz, supra note 92, at 306 (considering procedure required of agencies and
requirements for judicial review in new regulatory landscape); Sunstein, supra note 8I, at
1443-45 (dealing with enlargement of standing to seek judicia\ review ofissues posed under
newer regulatory provisions).
139. Sunstein, supra note 8I, at I436-37.
I40. /d. at I442.
I41. See supra note 81.
I42.' Schwartz, supra note 92, at 306.
I43. United States v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 4IO U.S. 224, 238-48 (I973).
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When Florida East Coast Railway's informal classification of most
agency proceedings was combined with Overton Park's limitation of
judicial review to the record of actual agency deliberations, the pressure
became even greater to formalize informal proceedings in order to assure
fuller agency consideration and a richer record for review. When vermont
Yankee later limited procedures in informal proceedings to those required
by the APA, some lower courts and some commentators reacted by
attempting to find ways around the On the Record Rule so that what they
saw as appropriately informed judicial review could continue.
Despite this, Overton Park, Florida East Coast Railway and the later
vermont Yankee decision all seem aimed at homogenized, and relatively
lax, administrative procedures and judicial review for nearly all cases. The
level of intensity is pegged somewhere between the requirements of formal
proceedings under sections 556 and 557, and the nearly negligible intensity
of informal procedures as interpreted in the early days under the APA. 144
As presaged in Overton Park and revealed most clearly in Vermont Yankee,
the procedures and review would move slightly away from the negligible
end of the spectrum. · Even if the APA had intended de novo review for
most informal cases, such review would no longer be applicable. This is
illustrated in the very narrow circumstances in which Overton Park
recognized that de novo review of agency action was warranted. This can
be demonstrated more dramatically by the Court's failure to use even the
exceptions that it recognized in Overton Park.
There are almost no federal cases in which courts used either of the
"exceptions" recognized in Overton Park to justify a reviewing agency
action on an evidentiary record made or augmented in a judicial proceeding.145 It should not be surprising that these exceptions were ipsit dixits
on the part of the Overton Park Court, and remain so today. They run
completely contrary to the Overton Park Court's own model of administrative law, however different that may be from the world of the APA
framers.

144. Schwartz, supra note 92, at 306.
145. But see Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 782-84 (5th Cir. 1979), which allowed
a federal district to hold hearings that an agency should have held in a proper way and
finally dispose of the propriety of the sanction imposed by the agency against the plaintiff.
Porter has been described as the only one to use an Overton Park exception. Levin, Scope
of Review Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Section Report, 38 ADMIN. L. REv.
239, 273-74 (1986). See also ALFRED C. AMAN JR. AND WILLIAM T. MAYTON,
ADMINIS1RATIVE LAW 459 n.7 (1993).
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The First Exception: "When the Action Is Adjudicatory in Nature
and the Agency Fact.finding Procedures Are Inadequate"

The normal protocol for any defect in an agency decision is remand, for
the reasons of expertise and presumed congressional intent. 146 This is true
whether the defect lies in the procedural rules themselves or in the
application of those rules to specific problems. On the one hand, if an
agency has procedures which, on paper, are adequate under the APA and
other relevant law, but misapplies them, the courts remand for an
appropriate hearing before the agency. 147 On the other hand, if an
agency's written procedures violate relevant law, a Court presumably would
strike them down and remand the case, requiring the agency to formulate
new procedures to use on remand. 148
Under these circumstances, why would a court hear evidence going to
the substantive merits of the agency decision? If in Chenery II the SEC
had applied a procedural rule requiring facts to be found with a ouija board,
there can be no doubt that the Court would have struck down that rule and
remanded for more conventional agency factfinding. If agency procedure
is sufficiently flawed to permit the court to set aside the agency action,
what is the point in developing substantive material not considered by the
agency? Presumably substantive review should occur once the agency
reaches a procedurally correct decision.

146. In Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorian, 470 U.S. 729 (1985), the Court stated:
If the record before the agency does not support the agency action, if the agency
has not considered all relevant factors, or if the reviewing court simply cannot
evaluate the challenged agency action on the basis of the record before it, the
proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for
additional investigation or explanation. The reviewing court is not generally
empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to
reach its own conclusions based on such an inquiry.
!d. at 744. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
147. See Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1979)
(permitting remand where agency fails to follow correct procedure); United States v.
Heffner, 420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1969) (deciding to strike agency action when agency
deviates from its own procedures); Bunyard v. Hotel, 702 F. Supp. 820 (D. Nev. 1988)
(finding that agency failed to interpret and apply CFR regulations correctly in remand);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 284 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Tenn. 1968)
(allowing court power to remand where agency erroneously excluded evidence).
14~. See National Distillers & Chern. Corp. v. United States Dep't of Energy, 498 F.
Supp ..707 (D. Del. 1980), aff'd, 662 F.2d 754 (TC?mp. Emerg. Ct. App. 1981) (finding that
agency must follow procedures within constraints of due process).
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Even in the unusual case in which the agency is so incompetent that it
cannot function appropriately, the solution is not for the court to become
the agency, but for the court to disable the agency from making decisions
until the political branches force the agency into sufficient compliance with
the law.
Potentially, there may be a very small set of cases, bordering on the null
set, within the first Overton Park exception. These might include truly
exceptional cases in which a court needs to hear evidence going to the
substantive merits of the agency decision, so that the court could take on
the function of the agency during an emergency while the agency is
disabled. This would occur only in those rare instances in which a court
concluded that either the Constitution or the agency's enabling act itself
required the court to so act in the interim. There are some scenarios in
which this might occur; 149 it is doubtful, however, that it ever will.

149. Assume that a statutory entitlement program administered by an agency creates a
right to receipt of immediate benefits. If so, depending on the urgency, it might make sense
for courts to adjudicate entitlement under the program, where they find an agency has
demonstrated an inability to do so on its own. If the program vests receipt of benefits
forthwith upon the demonstration of certain facts, then an argument can be made that there
is constitutional compulsion for the courts to adjudicate claims until the agency can do so
in a satisfactory way.
What about cases in which an individual does not seek a direct benefit, but is a
defendant in an agency enforcement proceeding seeking to avoid liability? Normally, in
such enforcement cases, disabling a hopelessly dysfunctional agency, by constantly striking
down its enforcement decisions, adequately protects private rights. Thus, there is no need
for the court to temporarily function as the agency by replacing it. In the ouija board
hypothetical above, if a court forbids the SEC from bringing an action for a penalty until
it adopts sensible and lawful factfinding procedures, the defendant is protected.
It is possible to imagine a case in which an agency so seriously neglects its duties to
protect the public interest that courts ought to read judicial adjudication of violations into
the statutory authorization until the agency regains reasonable legitimacy. These cases
would be situations in which immediate, large-scale harm could result, well before the
political processes could correct things: one might imagine, agencies which were
empowered to deal with serious epidemics or with serious problems of national security.
This Article, however, is not endorsing the view that a court should take over adjudications
in these circumstances by either augmenting the record made before an agency, or
completely changing the record by hearing matters originally. In only a limited subset of
cases isOvertonPark'sfirstexception warranted, given the model ofjudicial review adopted
by that case.
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B. The Second Exception: When Issues that were Not Before the
Agency Are Raised in a Proceeding to Enforce Non-Adjudicatory Agency
Action
As defined under the APA, non-adjudicatory action means only one
thing: rulemaking. 150 Hence this exception deals with a challenge to an
agency rule by someone against whom it has been enforced in an agency
proceeding. As with the first exception, this one seerris either completely
unwarranted or at least overly broad. Overton Park requires review only
on the informational record which was before the agency at the time of its
decision. 151
In a direct challenge to a rule brought by a regulated party, Overton Park
implies that the rule stands or falls based on the agency's actual reasons for
promulgation and any support for those reasons found in the record, for
example, the supporting materials actually considered by the agency. 152
A rule may be unwise, but if an agency has followed the minimally proper
requirements of section 553, it is a valid rule as long as it was appropriately
based on statutory authority, on the comments, and on any other materials
the agency actually considered.
This is not to say that those injured by a rule are without a remedy when
facts change or new evidence of earlier conditions calls the rule into
question. The usual remedy, in such cases, is a petition for a new
rulemaking in which either a new rule can be made or an existing one can
be modified or repealed. 153 A denial of such a petition is most likely
judicially reviewable, 154 and reversible, when clearly arbitrary and
capricious. 155 Moreover, when there has been review of an agency
decision not to hold a proceeding to repeal or modify a rule, judicial review

150. The APA formally defines "adjudication'" as "an agency process for the formulation
of an order." 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (1994). In turn, an "order" is the result of an agency matter
"other than rule making." /d. § 551(6). Implicitly, then, an action that is not adjudicatory
is rulemaking.
151. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
152. /d. at 419-20.
.
153. 5 U.S.C. § 553{e) (1994).
154. American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see
also WWHT, 656 F.2d at 817 (indicating that intensity of judicial scrutiny in. review for
arbitrary and capricious agency action varies from context to context and that review of
agency's decision not to undertake rulemaking is close to minimal end of spectrum of scrutiny). ,
155. · WWHT, 656 F.2d at 818-19 (surveying those few cases in which agency decision
to decline to undertake rulemaking was struck down).
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has been "on the record" within the meanmg of Overton Park. 156 Of
course, it is impossible to have review on the record of a new rulemaking
proceeding which did not yet occur. The review will be on the record of
the "proceeding" which did occur-the 553(e) proceeding in which a new
rulemaking proceeding was proposed and rejected by the agency. 157
It is possible to imagine cases which may call for exceptional procedures. There may even be extraordinary cases, involving changes in
circumstances or information in which it would be an abuse of discretion
for an agency not to initiate a proceeding to modify a rule. In such cases,
it would be an abuse of discretion for an agency not to take immediate
steps to rescind a rule. One might even argue further that in very clear
cases, courts should view a rule as having become invalid without agency
action to repeal it, and excuse non-compliance. 158 There is a temporal
dimension as well. It might be possible to argue that such a view applies
only to direct challenges to rules made by regulated persons shortly after
promulgation, but that de novo review on an augmented record is
appropriate when a rule is challenged in an enforcement proceeding. In
most cases, this seems unjustifiable. If one is going to depart from the
review-on-the-record model, the most propitious time to do so is immediately on direct review so that the rule's validity is more likely to be settled
at an early time, rather than to encourage an endless series of cases, each
claiming that an agency failed to consider some evidence available at the
time of decision. 159 Again there may be a small subset of enforcement
proceedings in which it may make principled sense to allow challenge to
a rule on an augmented record. These seem reducible to the exceptional
circumstances discussed above, which would amount to gross abuse of
discretion in not suspending a rule based on dramatic new facts or newly
discovered facts. 160

156. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
157. American Horse, 812 F.2d at 5 (treating papers submitted in support of petition for
rulemaking as part of record for purposes of reviewing denial of that petition).
158. In such cases, it may be consistent with standard administrative procedure to permit
a regulated person to violate a rule even though (I) the agency followed minimal section
553 procedures in compiling the record, and (2) on the basis of that record and the agency's
actual contemporaneous reasons for promulgating it, the rule was neither arbitrary and
capricious nor in violation of law.
159. See WAL1ER GELLHORN ET AL., ADMINISlRATIVE LAW 450 (8th ed. 1986).
160. To accomplish this result, the court would have to proceed de novo and consider
evidence bearing on the rule's new illegitimacy because there was no proceeding belownot even a proceeding to consider whether or not to have a proceeding.
All of this is speculation, as opposed to the overwhelming reality of the On the
Record Rule. The Supreme Court has not invalidated a rule based on extra-record evidence
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Only occasionally have courts looked at post-decision events to help
them sustain decisions resting on predictions which seemed to have come
true. In one case, a court suggested, in dicta, that sufficient post-decision
events might be used to undercut an agency's decision if they showed the
underlying predictions to be "wholly fi.ctional." 161
In light of the fact that Overton Park's exceptions are not used and in
light of the fact that, in most circumstances, such exceptions are inconsistent with the Court's own general model of administrative law, this Article
turns skeptically to claims that the courts have nearly destroyed the On the
Record Rule by allowing exceptions going beyond those announced m
Overton Park.

III.

THE

ALLEGED DEMISE OF THE OVERTON PARK "ON THE RECORD
RULE"

A.

Introduction: The Stark and Wald Article

In 1984, Steven Stark and Sarah Wald published Setting No Records:
The Failed Attempt to Limit the Record in Review of Administrative
Action. 162 Their article has been cited in several cases 163 and was substantially excerpted, without criticism, in a fine and formative administrative law casebook. 164 While the real world existence of even the excep-

of dramatic subsequent events.
I61. See infra note 197 and accompanying text. Even in an instance in which such
treatment might be appropriate, it is doubtful that the Court would be willing to allow a
departure from the usual requirements that a rule must be followed unless: (1) subsequent
events are dramatic enough to deprive a rule of the slim rational basis required by due
process, (2) it is struck down on the original record, (3) it is repealed, or (4) in unusual
circumstances where a section 553(e) petition for a new rule has been denied, it is clear that
any course of action but repeal is arbitrary and capricious.
162. 36 ADMIN. L. REv. 333 (1984).
163. Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976, 991 n.166 (D.C. Cir. 1989); American Mining
Congress v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 617, 626 (lOth Cir. 1985); Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v.
Madigan, No. NA 90-1 75-C LEXIS 8691 (S.D. Ind. June 5, 1991), rev 'd, 956 F.2d 670, (7th
Cir.), reh 'gdenied, LEXIS 2650 (7th Cir. Feb. 26, 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 820 (1992).
164. GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 159, at 452-54. As this Article went to press, a new
edition of the Gellhorn Casebook (PETER L. S1RAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE'S
ADMINIS1RATIVE LAW (9th ed. 1995)) was published without inclusion of, or reference to,
the Stark and Wald article, or for that matter Court of Appeals cases such as Asarco, Inc.
v. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1980), or Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir.
1977), which had recognized exceptions to the On the Record Rule not rec6gnized in
Overton Park, exceptions to determine, for example, whether an agency considered relevant
factors or to provide a court with the technical background necessary to make an assessment

HeinOnline -- 10 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 219 1996

220

THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:179

tions identified in Overton Park seems doubtful, Stark and Wald conclude
that the lower courts have widely ignored the On the Record Rule, riddling
it with new exceptions. In short, they conclude that the "on the record"
model, to some significant extent~ is a merely a paper model:
[A]n examination of the concept of review on the record in the courts surprisingly
reveals that the doctrine no longer exists in any coherent form, although judges and
analysts pretend that it is still viable. Faced with the difficulty of defining the
record in specific cases, courts have developed so many unwritten exceptions to
the doctrine of record review, that Industrious advocates now can introduce any
evidence they choose in cases reviewing informal administrative action. 165

Stark and Wald cast their conclusion in the form of a list of developing
exceptions to review on the record ranging far beyond the two exceptions
recognized in Overton Park. The exceptional situations they identify apply
to the following situations: (A) "when agency action is not adequately
explained in the record before the court"; (B) "when the agency failed to
consider factors which are relevant to its final decision"; (C) "when an
agency considered evidence which it failed to include in the record"; (D)
"when a case is so complex that a court needs more evidence to enable it
to understand the issues clearly"; (E) "in cases where evidence arising after
the agency action shows whether the decision was correct or not"; (F) "in
cases where agencies are sued for a failure to take action"; (G) "in cases
arising under the National Environmental Policy Act"; and (H) "in cases
where relief is at issue, especially at the preliminary injunction stage"} 66
It.is important to stress one point. Anyone who argues that lower federal
courts have ignored a clear Supreme Court doctrinal pronouncement,
forcefully reiterated by the Court within two years of its original statement, 167 needs at least some relatively clear and robust lower court
decisions to support the claim. Claims made in 1984 for the existence of
these categories rest either on assertions supported by slender authority or
on mistaken notions about the meaning of Overton Park's On the Record
Rule, particularly as to the notion of "record" incorporated in it. Also, the
cases decided since that article was published largely fail to support claims
that the Rule has eroded. 168

of rationality of an agency decision.
165. Stark & Wald, supra note 36, at 335-36.
166. /d. at 344-45. These propositions are labeled exceptions I to 8 by Stark and Wald.
167. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) {"The focal point for judicial review
should be the administrative record already in existence:').
168. In Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorian, 470 U.S. 729, 743-744 (1985), the Court
indicated that review of agency action is to be on the record of the agency proceeding
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Two of the claimed exceptions have strong surface appeal and seem to
owe their existence to contradictions inherent in administrative law-indeed
to contradictions in Overton Park itself. These do find some limited in the
case law, often in dicta. They are extremely difficult to harmonize with the
Supreme Court's general scheme for judicial review of Informal administrative action. Parts IIIB and IV of this Article deal with the categories one
by one, in each examining evidence available in 1984 and then developments since that time.

B.

Evidence for and Discussion of Exceptions .from 1971 to Present

In the case of several of their proposed exceptions, Stark and Wald
correctly conclude that lower federal courts have held evidentiary hearings.
As to several such exceptions, however, Stark and Wald are wrong in
concluding that this practice is inconsistent with the On the Record Rule as
prescribed in Overton Park. Characterizing practices consistent with
Overton Park as departures helps make a case that the On the Record Rule
is crumbling, possibly from general unworkability. A rule which the lower
courts have poked full of holes is likely to be a rule whose basic vision is
uns.ound. Below, the Article deals separately with each of the Stark and
Wald exceptions.

·1.

When an Agency Considered Evidence that It Failed to Include in
the Record169

This exception to the On the Record Rule turns out to be self-contradictory. Under Overton Park, the record in an informal proceeding includes
everything that an agency considered in reaching its decision, as well as
anything that it was required to consider, such as comments in rulemaking
proceedings. 170 Hence, nothing that was considered by an agency can be
considered outside of the "record" in an Overton Park sense. It may be
true that what the agency presents as the record is not actually comprehensive.171 When a court allows augmentation of the record, submitted by

"except in rare circumstances." The last proviso seems more plausibly to refer to Overton
Park's original exceptions than to endorse the subsequent ones described by Stark and Wald.
169. This is the third on the Stark and Wald list of exceptions. Stark and Wald, supra
note 36, at 347-48.
170. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420 (stating that "[r]eview is to be based on the full
administrative record that was before the Secretary at the time he made his decision");
Camp, 411 U.S. at 142 ("[T]he focal point for judicial review should be the administrative
record already in existence.").
. '171. See cases cited infra notes 175-76.
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an agency, to include material actually considered, but not initially
presented, to the reviewing court by the agency, it is attempting to ensure
review on the record in the Overton Park sense. In other words, it is
following Overton Park's dictates.
Cases decided post-Stark and Wald make clear that the record in an
Overton Park sense is what was before the agency at the time of its
decision and not simply what the agency chooses to proffer as supporting
its decision. 172 One particularly clear statement is that of the D.C. Circuit
in a case decided shortly after the publication of the Stark and Wald article:
If a court is to review an agency's action fairly, it should have before it neither
more nor less information than did the agency when it made its decision. The
Supreme Court's formulation in Overton Park cautions against both under- and
over-inclusiveness in the administrative record before the reviewing court.
"[R]eview is to be based on the full administrative record before the Secretary at
the time he made his decision." [citing Overton Park] To review less than the full
administrative record might allow a party to withhold evidence unfavorable to its
case .... 173

Since then, when courts clearly address the issue, they generally
recognize that materials before the agency at the time of decision are not
extra-record materials and that the "record submitted by the agency may be
supplemented on judicial review to reflect the full record in the Overton
Park sense."174

I72. !d.
173. Walter 0. Boswell Memorial Hasp. v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir. I984).
This case was decided in the same year the Stark and Wald article was published; however,
it was not decided until November, I 984. Most likely, the case was decided too late in the
year to have been available to those authors.
I 74. In Thompson v. United States Dep't of Labor, 885 F.2d 55 I, 555 (9th Cir. I 989),
the Ninth Circuit proposed: "The whole administrative record, however, 'is not necessarily
those documents that the agency has compiled and submitted as "the" administrative record
. . . . The "whole" administrative record ... consists of all documents and materials
directly or indirectlyconsidered by agency decision-makers and includes evidence contrary
to the agency's position."' !d. (citations omitted) (quoting Exxon Corp. v. United States
Dep't of Energy, 9I F.R.D. 26, 32 (N.D. Tex. I98I). See also Citizens for Envtl. Quality
v. United States, 73 I F. Supp. 970, 982 (D. Colo. I 989) (finding that court may
"supplement" record submitted by agency to reflect "whole record"); National Wildlife
Fed'n v. Burford, 677 F. Supp. I445, 1457 (D. Mont. I985) ("An agency may not submit
an administrative record to the court which contains only documents favoring the agency's
decision and omits documents present in the agency's file which bear upon matters before
the court.").
Some opinions do continue to describe discovery of material not supplied. by the
agency but before it at the time of the decision as an extra-record inquiry, but none o,qhem
suggests a belief that such an inquiry is an exception to Overton Park's ··on the Record
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When Agency Action Is Not Adequately Explained in the Record
Before the Court-s

This exception, as well, rests on a misunderstanding. Stark and Wald
cite two cases, Overton Park itself and a decision of a lower federal court
which did not permit the hearing of extra record evidence. 176 The lower
federal court case apparently is cited to reiterate Overton Park's statements
that, if an agency fails to explain its decision adequately, a reviewing court
can require testimony of administrative officials as to the reasons for
reaching the decision. 177
One could view the explanation as part of the record, and in an expanded
sense of the word it is. However, it is not what the Overton Park Court
had in mind when it announced its requirement of review on the record that
was before the agency. The Court separated the record from the explanation, when it stressed that the explanation was to be one revealing the
agency's actual reasoning and that it must be supported by a separate set
of materials-the record before the agency. 178 In short, the record is an
evidentiary record. The explanation is different: it attempts to justify the

Rule." In these cases, the court seems to be using the word "record" in a secondary nonOverton Park sense to mean what the agency provides to the court. Animal Defense
Counsel v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 1432, 1436 (9th Cir. 1988). Hodel was later clarified by
Thompson, 885 F.2d at 555. One Supreme Court majority opinion describes the record
Overton Park refers to as "the record the agency presents to the court." Florida Power &
Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743-44 (1985). In that case, however, there is no
indication that the Court had in mind a situation in which such a record did not reflect the
full record. These words seem more a loose and inaccurate paraphrase of OvertonParkthan
a readjustment of its notion of record regarding a situation not before the court.
175. This is the first exception on the Stark and Wald list. Stark and Wald, supra note
36, at 344-46.
176. Madison County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 622 F.2d
393 (8th Cir. 1980).
177. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
178. /d. at 419-20 (finding "post hoc rationalization" by agency of its previous
inadequate reasoning and citing Chenery, which required agency decision to be justified by
its actual reasons at time of its decision). The Court's solution was either for the agency
to prepare a contemporaneous explanation of its reasoning or to submit to examination in
court as to the reasoning under which it acted. /d. The Court's rejection of "post hoc
rationalizations" makes this especially clear. !d. The Court, however, does realize that
giving the agency an opportunity to reconstruct its reasoning in court has its post hoc perils,
presumably because such reconstruction may be influenced by post-decision events in ways
diffi-cult' to -winnow out. /d.
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agency decision by rationally connecting the evidentiary record with
applicable law and policy.
If an agency's explanation of its decision is inadequate because it is
insufficiently detailed, Overton Park says that the agency is permitted to
more fully explain why it reached its decision on the evidentiary record
before it. 179 The latter deficiency, however, does not permit a trial court
to hear evidence that goes beyond the evidence the agency had before it
when reaching its decision. 180 The cases dealing with explanations have
nothing to do with augmenting the factual record the agency had before it
when it reasoned its conclusion. These cases turn, instead, on whether the
explanation is both internally logical, sufficiently detailed, and supported
by material in the record.. In the narrower sense, the explanation must
encompass the factual material considered by the agency.
Once this "exception" is understood to permit nothing more than a
court's consideration of "evidence" of an agency's actual reasons for a
decision (as opposed to new evidence about the world external to the
agency's decision process), it is no exception at all .. It is not an alteration
to, but a reiteration of, the Overton Park doctrine.
3. In Cases Where Agencies Are Sued for a Failure to Take Action 181

If there has been no proceeding-no rulemaking or adjudication-there
can be no record of such non-existent proceeding on which to base review.
To the extent, however, that an agency's refusal to hold such a proceeding
is reviewable, there is a record on which the agency based its decision not
to commence such a proceeding. Analogously to Overton Park, the record
is everything the agency actually considered or was required to consider in
deciding not to start an adjudication or rulemaking. 182

179. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420.
180. In Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973), the Court stated:
The proceeding in the District Court was obviously not brought to enforce the
Comptroller's decision, and the only deficiency suggested in agency action or
proceedings is that the Comptroller inadequately explained his decision. As
Overton Park demonstrates, however, that failure, if it occurred in this case, is not
a deficiency in factfinding procedures such as to warrant the de novo hearing
ordered in this case ....
!d. at 142.
181. This is the sixth exception on the Stark and Wald list. Stark and Wald, supra note
36, at 350-51.
182. See supra note 157 (describing record for review of agency refusal to grant
rulemaking petition).
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Despite Heckler v. Chaney's 183 holding that most agency decisions not
to bring enforcement proceedings are not judi·cially reviewable, refusals to
institute rulemaking proceedings, including those to repeal or amend a rule,
seem to continue to be subject to judicial review. 184 Presumably, an
extremely weak version of arbitrary and capricious review applies. 185
This most likely means that the agency must consider a petition requesting
agency action. and supporting materials, but that only an outrageously bad
decision will be overturned. The agency may exercise less care and the
reviewing court should be more forgiving of a decision undercut by such
a record.
No one, least of all any of the Justices who decided Overton Park, would
have been surprised that, if judicial review were to occur in such cases, the
reviewing court's scrutiny would not be confined to the reco:rd of a
proceeding that did not exist. As with Overton Park, the relevant record
is made up of the materials underlying the actual decision challenged, or,
as in this case, the materials supporting the agency decision not to hold a
proceeding. 186
·

4. Suits Seeking Preliminary Relief8 Stark and Wald assert that courts allow extra-record evidence. in cases in
which injunctive relief is sought against agency action. One of the two
cases they cite to in their article looks at prior agency opinions to determine
consistency, 188 which is not an excursion into factual material not before
the agency at the time it reached its decision. The other cited case involves
a petition for preliminary equitable relief 189
Certainly, when parties seek a temporary restraining order or a temporary
injunction against agency action, for example, against enforcement of a rule
alleged to be arbitrary and capricious, courts will need to develop a record

183. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
184. American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d I, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
185. WHHT, 656 F.2d at 817-18.
186. See supra note 157 (discussing record for review of denials to grant petition for
rulemaking).
·
187. This is the eighth exception, "H", on the Stark and Wa\d list. Stark and Wald,
supra note 36, at 353-54.
188. Stark and Wald, supra note 36, at 354 n.4 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. United
States Dep't of Energy, 449 F. Supp. 760 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Standard Oil Co.
v. United States Dep't of Energy, 596 F.2d 1029 (Temp. ·Emer. Ct. App. 1978)).
189, ·.GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 404 F. Supp. 352 (D. Del.
1975).
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to answer factual questions made relevant by the judicially created,
equitable standards for granting such relief. One such question is the
probable magnitude of needless harm, if any, suffered, pendente lite, by a
challenger, on the assumption arguendo that the agency's rule or order
proves invalid. To resolve this issue, the District Court may need all sorts
of evidence about the plaintiffs circumstances and about the agency
actions' effect on him during this limited period. This sort of evidence will
never have been fully developed in the agency record. The agency's
weighing of costs and benefits to regulated parties is likely to be more
general in nature and certainly will not have focused on a period defined
by pendency of litigation. Evidence of harm pendente lite, however, is not
used to challenge the substance of the agency decision, but rather to resolve
a preliminary issue unique to the lawsuit.
As to the harm to the public if a rule or order is suspended pending
review, the agency record will not always provide an answer. If the court
temporarily suspends a valid rule or order, it may need to determine how
much harm a suspension will impose on the public. This inquiry overlaps
the inquiry involved in reviewing the agency's decision, but it seeks to
determine probable harm, not over the life of the rule or order, but for the
much shorter period defined by the pendancy of the litigation. It is,
therefore, beyond the scope of the On the Record Rule and, consequently,
is not an exception to it.
Finally, in assessing another factor relevant to preliminary relief--the
probability of success on the merits-the court should assess the probable
validity of the rule the same way it would on full consideration. This
means a cursory look at the record in the Overton Park sense. If the court
were to look at extra-record evidence to assess this factor, then it would
recognize a true exception. Courts do not seem to do this. A court might
find such an extra-record inquiry especially compelling if immediate relief
is needed and the administrative record has not yet been assembled. Even
if a court were to look at extra-record evidence for this purpose, with a
commitment to decide the ultimate merits on the record once assembled, it
seems fair to describe what the court has done as less than extra-record
review. Such a court would have made the best guess it could on materials
available to it. The court will not have completely invalidated agency
action based on such extra-record material, although it may have suspended
it temporarily.
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5. Suits Under NEPA 190
Stark and Wald view cases under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPAY 91 as falling within a blanket exception to the On the Record
Rule. 192 It is true that a great many of the cases allowing extra-record
evidence are NEPA cases. 193 This view, if correct, can best be explained
on the ground that NEPA is inconsistent with the APA's requirements as
described in Overton Park and, therefore~ NEPA overrides those requirements.194 On this view, the values underlying NEPA, for example,
requiring that those undertaking projects with significant impact on the
environment consider the various environmental costs of those impacts,
require that a court compare what an agency actually considered with what
it could have considered. 195
Certainly, one might attempt to extend this view beyond NEPA, arguing
that courts, in determining the arbitrariness and capriciousness of agency
action in general, must determine whether the agency considered relevant
factors. The failure of an agency to do so could be determined only by
comparing what is in an administrative record with what is not. From a
normative perspective, this Article is sympathetic to both this view and the
more general exception that Stark and Wald and a number of courts have
recognized to accommodate it. From a descriptive point of view, however,
the Supreme Court's general model for arbitrary and capricious review is
more constraining than the model for review permitted under NEPA.

190. This is the seventh exception on the Stark and Wald list. Stark and Wald, supra
note 36, at 351-53.
191. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370b (1994).
192. See French, supra note 67, at 945-76 (discussing On the Record Rule in NEPA
cases).
193. See, for example, cases discussed in French, supra note 67, at 948-49.
194. French, supra note 67, at 989-90, seems to take this view, as do some of the cases.
See, e.g., Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1973) (tying permissibility of excursions beyond administrative record in NEPA cases to specific statutory intent
and not to more general exception for all cases). Some courts, however, do allow extrarecord evidence in NEPA cases on more generally applicable exceptions, such as to
determine whether an agency has considered relevant factors, or to allow a court background
for assessing a technically complex case. French, supra note 67, at 951-52. These
exceptions are listed separately by Stark and Wald and addressed at length in the next PART
IV.
195. French, supra note 67, at 989-90.
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In Cases Where Evidence Arising After the Agency Action Shows
Whether the Decision Was Correct or Nof 96

This alleged exception is so flatly at odds with Overton Park that, if it
exists, it renders the On the Record Rule meaningless. The issue is either
whether an agency· decision was correct when issued, or whether it would
be correct now in light of the new information. Because Overton Park
clearly chose the historical approach over one which would require judicial
reassessment of a decision based on new evidence, there is almost no
caselaw supporting this exception.
Great harm may be inflicted by a decision which turns out to be wrong,
although it was reasonable when rendered. This problem is likely to be
most acute in rulemaking. There are compelling reasons, however, why
courts are not given revisory power. First, where a rule or a coercive order
in an adjudication proves wrong and harmful, after all the factors are
balanced, an agency can be expected to behave responsibly. A motion to
reopen an adjudication, a petition to reconsider a failure to bring an
enforcement proceeding, and a petition to repeal or amend a rule are
appropriate ways to deal with new evidence under an Overton Park model.
At least in the case of agency failure to make or amend a rule, courts are
likely available to grant relief in unconscionable cases.
Stark and Wald cite two cases for this exception for post-decision
developments. 197 Cases decided since i 984 clearly state that post-decision
information is not to be used to undercut an agency's decision. 198

196. This is the fifth exception on the Stark and Wald list. Stark and Wald, supra note
36, at 349-50.
197. Amoco Oil v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting that new data
supplied by EPA helped court reach conclusion that EPA's original predictions had rational
basis); American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1034 (lOth Cir. 1976) (stating
same as above), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977). One might view these cases as not
suggesting that post decisional studies could be admitted to undercut an agency's predictions,
but rather as simply allowing a court in a close case to conclude that agency predictions
were not unreasonable. But see Association ofPac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 811-12
(9th Cir. 1980) ("If the post decisional studies showed that the Agency proceeded upon
assumptions that were entirely fictional or utterly without scientific support, then
post-decisional data might be utilized by the party challenging the regulation.").
198. Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1296 (9th Cir. 1990); Rutherford v. United
States, 806 F.2d 1455, 1461 {lOth Cir. 1986). But see Conservation Law Found. v. Clark,
590 F. Supp. 1467, 1475 (D. Mass. 1984) (allowing supplementation of record to show
factors agency should have considered, but did not).
,• ·
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7. The Last Two Exceptions
The last two exceptions asserted by Stark and Wald apply to the
following situations: "When the agency failed to consider factors which are
relevant to its final decision, and when a case is so complex that a court
needs more evidence to enable it to understand the issues clearly."199 A
substantial number of courts have found these exceptions necessary-while
arguably inconsistent with Overton Park's On the Record Rule-to comply
sufficiently with other requirements of that case, including the requirement
that the court conduct a "thorough, probing, in-depth review." This ensures
that a court has considered all the relevant factors.
If an agency has not considered a factor that it should have considered,
how can that possibly appear in the administrative record, defined by
Overton Park as the set of materials considered by the agency? How could
the Overton Park Court expect that probing review could occur if it were
confined to a record, when no record can contain all of the information to
test whether it rationally supports a decision? The next section of this
Article deals with these questions in detail.

lV.

THE "ON THE RECORD RULE" AND ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
RATIONALITY ANALYSIS

·A.

The Exceptions for Material Bewing on Relevant Factor Analysis
and Technical Background Material

One would imagine that the thirteen years under Overton Park's "hard
look" regime would have amply exposed the tensions between requirements
for intense review and requirements that such ·review be limited to the
record before the agency. Despite this, Stark and Wald were able to offer
relatively few cases in which the pressures for careful review resulted in
recognition of new exceptions to the On the Record Rule. 200 Stark and
Wald claimed that, among other exceptions created by lower federal courts
to destroy "any coherent form" of the On the Record Rule, are the

199. These are exceptions "B" and "D" on the Stark and Wald list. Stark and Wald,
supra note 36, at 346-47, 348-49.
200. For examples of the relevant factors exception, Stark and Wald cite: Asarco, Inc.
v. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1980); Hyatt Grain & Feed, Inc. v. Bergland, 446 F. Supp.
457,467 (D. Kan. 1978), afl'd, 602 F.2d 929 (lOth Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1073
(1980); and Conservation Law Found. v. Watt, No. 83-0506, slip op. (D. Mass. Apr. 25,
1984). Stark and Wald, supra note 36, at 346-47.
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exceptions dealing with the following situations: "When the agency failed
to consider factors which are relevant to its final decision, and when a case
is so complex that a court needs more evidence to enable it to understand
the issues clearly."201
For both the period antedating and that following the Stark and Wald
article, it is extremely difficult to determine the number of cases in which
a court has either acted on, or at least recognized in dicta, either of these
exceptions to the On the Record Rule. In many cases where material is
added to the physical record in court, and either or both of these exceptions
are cited, courts may have simply allowed an agency to explain its decision,
as permitted by Overton Park, without adducing factual material which was
not before the agency at the time it decided. In many cases, it is especially
difficult to separate dicta from the holding. Sometimes it is not clear from
the opinions whether an "exception," as understood by a particular court is
truly an exception, inconsistent with the On the Record Rule. 202
There are, however, some courts which do go beyond the On the Record
Rule in order to perform "relevant factor analysis" as they understand
it. 203 One clear example of a case recognizing a true "relevant factors"
exception is Conservation Law Foundation of New England v. Clark. 204
In that case, the court allowed production of affidavits of experts and other
material not before the agency at the time of its decision, so that it could
determine whether the agency had performed an adequate analysis of
relevant factors:
It will often be impossible, especially when highly technical matters are
involved, for the court to determine whether the agency took into consideration all
relevant factors unless it looks outside the record to determine what matters the
agency should have considered but did not. The court cannot adequately discharge
its duty to engage in a "substantial inquiry'' if it is required to take the agency's
word that it considered all relevant matters. In the instant case, it is arguable that

201. These are exceptions "B" and "D" on the Stark and Wald list. Stark and Wald,
supra note 36, at 346-47, 348-49.
202. See, e.g., AT&T Information Systems, Inc. v. General Services Admin., 810 F.2d
1233, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1987): "Although the record may be supplementep to provide, for
example, background information or evidence of whether all relevant factors were examined
by an agency ... we have made clear that the new material should be merely explanatory
of the original record." What does '·explanatory of the original record" mean?: (I)
explanatory of its true contents, or (2) explanatory of how the agency rationalized its
decision based on the record. Neither such explanation would be a true exception,
inconsistent with Overton Park's On the Record Rule.
203. See infra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
204. 590 F. Supp. 1467, 1474-75 & n.5 (D. Mass. 1984), aff'dsub nom., Conservation
Law Found. v. Secretary of Interior, 864 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1989).

HeinOnline -- 10 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 230 1996

1996]

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION

231

the Park Service failed to consider adequately whether extensive ORV use of the
Seashore, even if ecologically compatible, was an "appropriate public use" as
mandated by the Seashore Act. Therefore, the court will admit documentary
evidence that bears on this issue, including professional articles, expert affidavits,
and .figures on Cape Cod beach visitation. 205

There are other cases which seem to hold in favor of a true exception for
relevant factors purposes206 and s_till others which may endorse such an
exception in dicta. 207

205. /d. at 1475 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
206. Listed below are cases in which the court's opinion leaves some reason to believe
that evidence was admitted under a relevant factors exception to Overton Park's On the
Record Rule. Many cases in this list, however, may be explained on other grounds. For
example, they may tum on the availability of another exception, such as NEPA's arguably
more generous view of the appropriate record for review. These cases include the following:
Love v. Thomas, 838 F.2d I 059 (9th Cir. 1988) (specifically approving augmentation under
relevant factor exception), affg in part and rev 'gin part on other grounds, 668 F. Supp.
1443, 1448-51 (D. Or. 1987) (allowing augmentation of record to evaluate whether agency
took into account all relevant factors, looked at data readily available to, but not considered
by agency, and described what agency would have found if agency had conducted a minimal
investigation); Arkla Exploration Co. v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 734 F.2d 347, 357 (8th Cir.
1984) (upholding district court's supplementation of record, among other reasons, to
determine whether all relevant factors were considered), cert. denied,469 U.S. 1158 (1985);
Asarco, Inc. v. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153, 1160-62 (9th Cir. 1980) (asserting that district court
"went too far in consideration of evidence outside the administrative record," but finding
extra record material admissible); Conservation Law Found. v. Clark, 590 F. Supp. 1467,
1474-75 & n.5 (D. Mass. 1984) (allowing augmentation of record to show factors agency
should have considered but did not, including affidavits from professional article experts and
figures on Cape Cod beach visitation), affd sub nom., Conservation Law Found. v.
Secretary of Interior, 864 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1989); Hough v. Marsh, 557 F. Supp. 74, 84
n.l2, 86 n.l7 (D. Mass. 1982) (finding it necessary to go beyond record to consider material
bearing on whether agency sufficiently considered all relevant factors); Hiatt Grain & Feed,
Inc. v. Bergland, 446 F. Supp. 457, 467 (D. Kan. 1978), a.ff'd, 602 F.2d 929 (lOth Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980).
207. Sierra Club v. United States Dep't ofTransp., 695 F. Supp. 460, 463-64 (N.D. Cal.
1988) (recognizing relevant factor exception in dicta while using background information
exception), rev'd on other grounds, 948 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1991); AT&T Information
Systems v. GSA, 810 F.2d 1233, 1235-36 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (recognizing, in dicta, exception
to enable court to determine whether agency considered all relevant factors-but not using
such exception); Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 285-86 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (recognizing exception to exclusivity of administrative record where necessary to
determine if agency considered relevant factors); American Legion v. Derwinski, 827 F.
Supp. 805, 811-12 (D.D.C. 1993) (recognizing relevant factor exception in dicta, but
admitting extra-record material as explanation of decision), a.ff'd, 54 F.3d 789, 811 (D.C.
Cir. 1995), petition/or cert.filed, (Aug. II, 1995); Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v.·
Thompson, 811 F. Supp. 635, 642 n.4 (D. Utah 1993) (reviewing exceptions to On the
Record Rule, including information relevant to whether agency failed to consider"relevant
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Likewise the "technical background exception" is not always mistakenly
invoked to justify nothing more than a court's assembling the record as
required by Overton Park. Sometimes new material, not considered by the
agency, is considered on judicial review of the agency's decision. 208 One
clear example is Arkla Exploration Co. v. Texas Oil & Gas Corporation.209 Although, in that ca~e, some evidence was admitted simply to
complete the record in the Overton Park sense, other information, not
considered by the agency, was admitted to provide the court with a feel for
the issues:
The district court's admission of explanatory evidence served to help the court
understand the complex nature of petroleum geology. It also served the related
and equally important ·purpose of educating the court as to the kinds of scientific,
technical, and economic data that are relevant to a legally correct [agency]
determination. 210

There are other cases which seem to hold that courts may go beyond the
record to provide a court with background information due to the "highly

evidence," but not allowing supplementation); Saint James Hosp. v. Heckler, 579 F. Supp.
757,762 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (discussing plaintiff's arguments and applicable law which argues
for admission of litigation affidavits based inter alia on need to determine consideration of
relevant factors, but refusing to admit them because record was sufficient to decide case),
aff'd, 760 F.2d 1460 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 902 (1985); Abington Memorial
Hosp. v. Heckler, 576 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 750 F.2d 242 (3d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 863 (1985) (acknowledging Asarcoexceptions for background
information or information bearing on consideration of relevant factors, but refusing to
consider plaintiff's affidavit which went to merits of agency's decision); No Oilport! v.
Carter, 520 F. Supp. 334, 345-37 (W .D. Wash. 1981) (recognizing relevant factors exception
but actually justifying admission based on special nature ofNEPA and on need for agency
to explain its decision as in Overton Park; allowing affidavits to establish adequacy of
Environmental Impact Statement and to assist in explication of agency's decision in NEPA
case).
208. See infra notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
209. 734 F.2d 347, 357-60 (8th Cir. 1984).
210. /d.
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technical nature of the subject matter,"211 and others which seem to
endorse such a true exception in dicta. 212

211. Likewise, some cases possibly go beyond the record due to the "highly technical
nature of the subject matter." Love v. Thomas, 858 F.2d 1347, 1356 (9th Cir. 1988)
(specifically approving augmentation under technical background information exception),
afl'ginpartandrev'ginparton other grounds, 668 F. Supp. 1443, 1448-51 (D. Or. 1987)
(allowing augmentation of record in order, among other reasons, to provide technical
background necessary to evaluate record); Norwich Eaton Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Bowen,
808 F.2d 486, 489 (6th Cir. 1987) (apparently approving district court's consideration of
evidence outside administrative record order to determine whether administrative record was
adequate, citing need to assess consideration of relevant factors in highly technical case;
arguably dicta because court finds that district court did not use extra-record evidence it
admitted imd hence any error would have been non-prejudicial}, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816
(1987); Arkla Exploration Co. v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 734 F.2d 347, 357 (8th Cir. 1984)
(upholding district court's supplementation of record to explain record, among other reasons,
to explain complex nature of petroleum geology, to educate court as to kinds of scientific,
technical, and economic data which were relevant to decision, and ultimately to determine
whether all relevant factors were considered, but not to substitute court's judgment on
merits), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158 (1985); Association ofPac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d
794, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1980) (opinion by Anthony Kennedy, C.J.) (allowing direct court of
appeals review of EPA decision, admitting into evidence studies done after agency decision
as illuminating original decision); Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep't ofTransp., 695 F. Supp. 460,
463-64 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (considering plaintiff's declarations outside record for purposes of
background information, but not on merits), rev 'don other grounds, 948 F.2d 568 (9th Cir.
1991); Conservation Law Found. v. Clark, 590 F. Supp. 1467, 1474-75 & n.5 (D. Mass.
1984), afl'd sub nom, Conservation Law Found. v. Secretary oflnterior, 864 F.2d 954 (1st
Cir. 1989) (allowing augmentation of record to provide technical clarification); MGPC, Inc.
v. Duncan, 581 F. Supp. 1047, 1059 (D. Wyo. 1984) (allowing introduction of plaintiff's
affidavits and endorsing extra-record review for purposes of (1) aiding court in understanding issues, (2) giving court a background with which to better understand record, and
(3) helping court to determine adequacy of record), rev 'don other grounds, 763 F.2d 422
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied sub nom., MGPC, Inc. v. United States Dep't of
Energy, 474 U.S. 823 (1985); Hiatt Grain & Feed, Inc. v. Bergland, 446 F. Supp. 457, 467
(D. Kan. 1976), ajJ'd, 602 F.2d 929 (lOth Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1073 (1980).
212. Franklin Savings Ass'n v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 934 F.2d 1127,
1137-38 (lOth Cir. 1991) (discussing exceptions to On the Record Rule, but limiting review
to record which was adequate to allow effective review); Environmental Defense Fund v.
Castle, 657 F.2d 275, 285-86 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (recognizing exception to exclusivity of
administrative record where necessary to provide technical background necessary to
understand agency's decision); American Legion v. Derwinski, 827 F. Supp. 805, 811-12
(D.D.C. 1993) (recognizing technical background exception in dicta but apparently admitting
.material only to explain what actually occurred in agency below), ajJ'd, 54 F.3d 789, (D.C.
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, American Legion v. Brown, 116 S. Ct. 697 ( 1996); Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance v. Thompson, 811 F. Supp. 638, 642 n.4 (D. Utah 1993) (reviewing
exceptions to On the' Record Rule, to include material which explains "technical information
in the record," but not allowing supplementation); Abington MemorialHosp. v. Heckler, 576
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What is convincing about Stark and Wald's thesis is that the record of
an administrative proceeding cannot be the only material that a court
considers when it reviews an agency decision for basic rationality under the
arbitrary and capricious test. By analogy to Goedel's theorem, it seems that
no system, including an administrative record, can determine its own
validity. 213 The validity of any system must be independently defined by
another system whose own validity is either appraised in terms of yet
another such system or is a postulate, or, for example, taken on faith.
The requirement that the government act rationally is one such postulate
of our legal system, although the courts' vigor in enforcing it varies from
context to context. 214 When action by the legislature is measured against
constitutional (substantive due process and equal protection) requirements
of rationality, the courts generously presume that such requirements have
been satisfied. 215 The current interpretation of the non-constitutional
arbitrary and capricious standard reflects a judgment that agencies should
be held to a higher standard than the legislature itself.216
At a minimum, a judge must apply techniques of rationality analysis to
the material in the record. Some of these, such as ordinary logic and
mathematics, are likely to be seen in precisely the same way by all judges.
For example, all would concede the irrationality of an agency's action
based on a huge mistake in mathematical multiplication or of its reasoning

F. Supp. 1081, 1087 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (acknowledging Asarcoexceptions for background
information or information bearing on consideration of relevant factors, but refusing to
consider plaintiff's affidavit which goes to merits of agency's decision), aff'd, 750 F.2d 242
(3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 ·u.s. 863 (1985); Saint James Hasp. v. Heckler, 579 F.
Supp. 757, 762 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (discussing plaintiff's arguments and applicable l~w which
argues for admission oflitigation affidavits to clarify original information before agency, but
refusing to admit them because record was sufficient to decide case), afl'd, 760 F.2d 1460
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 902 (1985); No Oilport! v. Carter, 520 F. Supp. 334, 34537 (W.D. Wash. 1981) (recognizing technical background information exception but actually
justifying admission based on special nature ofNEPA and on need for agency to explain its
decision as required by Overton Park).
213. DOUGLAS HOFSTADTER, GOEDEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID
(1988).
214. JOHN E. NOWAK AND RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 387-93 (1995)
(summarizing rational basis due process and equal protection scrutiny since 1937 and
indicating that, except in special cases such as those involving suspect classes or fundamental
rights, the constitutional requirements of minimum rationality are easily satisfied).
215. !d.; Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); Williamson v.
Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154
(1938).
216. Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 n.9
(1983).
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"if x then y; x but not y." They might disagree as to the appropriate use
of game theory, 217 probability theory/ 18 or the psychology of bias219
in decisionmaking. Still, all of these theories are relevant in analyzing the
rationality of an agency decision and all are external to the record. These
techniques, particularly their common sense core, are part of the analytical
reasoning that each judge may bring to the record. It is, however,
implausible to assume that arbitrary and capricious relevant factor analysis
is limited to these sorts of considerations. Precisely because they
necessarily constitute the mind of the analyst, the use of techniques of
rationality in judicial review are so fundamental as to be assumed
compatible with the On the Record Rule, without consciousness of that
assumption.
The more difficult question is when material about specific states of the
world can be considered by reviewing judges, even though such material
was not in the administrative record (was not considered by the agency in
reaching its decision). Stark and Wald/20 a few lower court holdings221
and much dicta222 all suggest that such material is allowed (1) to demonstrate the existence of relevant factors that the agency did not consider, or
(2) to provide technical background against which the rationality of the
agency's decision can be assessed.

1. Relevant Factors
For a variety of reasons, as Stark and Wald and many cases suggest, the
regime of Overton Park does not contemplate that the need to pursue
relevant factor analysis can trump the On the Record Rule. A principal
reason is the clarity of the Rule as articulated in Overton Park and the
narrowness of the exceptions explicitly recognized;
This conclusion seems particularly potent in light of the Supreme Court's
current view of informal proceedings defined precisely as those involving

217. For a general discussion of this subject, see THOMAS c. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY
OF CONFLICT (1981); see also DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND TilE LAW
(1994).
218. LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS (1st ed. 1954).
219. For a general discussion of this subject, see JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY AND
HEURISTICS (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
220. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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tightly bounded rationality, rather than a more extensive search for the right
answer. 223
An administrative decision is reversible on procedural grounds if the
record was not compiled by giving interested parties the minimum notice
and input required by the APA. 224 Allowing a court to take evidence to
consider the existence of possible relevant factors not developed in the
record and not so well known and clearly relevant as to be judicially
noticeable seems a violation of Overton Park's requirement that administrative action be sustained or struck down on the record of information
actually before the agency at the time of its decision. 225 This seems an
especially forceful conclusion when combined with Vermont Yankee's226
vision of informal proceedings as minimalist, or not going beyond the
limited requirements imposed by the APA. 227 Particularly significant are
Vermont Yankee's views of appropriate agency procedure in defining
appropriate judicial review of informal agency action. Specifically Vermont
Yankee's view that, on judicial review of informal agency action, the
adequacy of the agency record to support its decision should not be judged
by comparing that record with the court's guess about the sort of record
which would have been generated by procedures more intensive than those
required for informal rulemaking:
The court below uncritically assumed that additional procedures will automatically
result in a more adequate record because it will give interested parties more of an
opportunity to participate in and contribute to the proceedings. But informal
rulemaking need not be based solely on the transcript of a hearing held before an
agency. Indeed, the agency need not even hold a formal hearing. Thus, the
adequacy of the record in this type of proceeding is not correlated directly to the
type of procedural devices employed, but rather turns on whether the agency has
followed the statutory mandate of the Administrative Procedure Act or other
relevant statutes. If the agency is compelled to support the rule which it ultimately
adopts with the type of record produced only after a full adjudicatory hearing, it
simply will have no choice but to conduct a full adjudicatory hearing prior to
promulgating every rule. In sum, this sort of unwarranted judicial examination of

223. If informality has any legitimate province at all it involves those decisions in which
the expense of requiring the agency to look closely at all arguably relevant material is not
worth the expense of doing so, based on the presumed trustworthiness of the agency in light
of what is at stake.
224. 5 u.s.c. § 706 (1994).
225. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971).
226. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 546-48 (1978).
227. !d.
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perceived procedural shortcomings of a rulemaking proceeding can do nothing but
seriously interfere with that process prescribed by Congress. 228

Additionally, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp v. LTV Corp./29 is indicative of the Court's view of the degree of freedom that agencies possess in
deciding some matters without help in developing the information. In that
case~ the Court noted that there is no APA requirement permitting notice
of the issues or a right to participate in informal adjudications. 230 To
permit de novo review to determine if an agency has considered relevant
factors guts both U!rmont Yankee and Pension Benefits, by permitting an
agency to adopt informal procedures, but for the price of surrender of the
protection of the on the record rule. Nothing in those two Supreme Court
cases, or any others, suggests such a modification of Overton Park.
If the Court did want to make more information available to a reviewing
court, presumably it would adjust Vermont Yankee and not the On the
Record Rule. Relaxing the On the Record Rule to permit consideration of
new matter on judicial review would make every agency proceeding a
potential nullity from the beginning, even though an agency has considered
all of the materials the APA requires it to consider and even though the
agency has reasoned impeccably from those materials to its decision. Thus,
from any realistic perspective, relaxing the On the Record Rule undoes
Vermont Yankee by requiring an agency to do more than the APA requires
if it wants to avoid having its decision overturned. Most plausibly, then,
both the On the Record Rule and ·U!rmont Yankee continue to coexist,
defining a system of minimal record development, with review for
rationality confined to that record.
In short, judicial review of an agency's failure to consider a relevant
factor not mentioned in the agency's explanation can occur if (1) there is
a failure to consider adequately a matter required to be considered by the
agency's statute, (2) a factor is well known and relevant enough to be
judicially noticeable as requiring consideration, or (3) if the explanation or
the record made by the appropriate agency procedures raises issues~
irrationally neglected by the agency. 231
Review for failure to consider factors is still meaningful even if it is
confined .to a consideration of the agency's explanation and the record. 232

228. /d. at 547.
229. 496 u.s. 633 (1990).
230. /d. at 656.
231.- /d.
232. This is particularly true given the fact that ( l) in an informal rulemaking interested
persons-almostanyone-can add to the record material seriously undercutting the agencies
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The record may raise a factor not adequately analyzed by the agency in its
explanation. This seems more likely in rulemaking where the APA
guarantees a right to comment which, in effect, accords all interested
persons a right to add to the administrative record material that undercuts
an agency's decision.
Inadequately treated relevant factors may appear in an agency's
explanation of its decision, or in other parts of the record, submitted to a
reviewing court by an agency, even though the factors are not extensively
analyzed. An agency's failure to consider the factors raised by the record
may be a justification for overturning the decision as arbitrary and
capricious, on the grounds that the relevant factors were not explored
adequately.
A portion of the famous air bags case, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Assoc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company, 233 provides an
example of an instance in which the Supreme Court overturned administrative action based on an agency's arbitrary and capricious failure to consider
adequately factors raised by the record that was before it at the time of the
decision. 234
In State Farm, the record itself revealed a factor that the Court thought
any solid reasoner working under the statute would examine more carefully,
although the agency made no attempt to do so.235 The Court noted that
the agency had considered human "inertia" in rejecting passive seatbelts as
not sufficiently cost effective,236 but did not consider that same factor
when it concluded that automatic seatbelts were not cost effective to a
sufficiently clear and great degree. 237
In an earlier, related proceeding, the agency concluded that lethargy or
lack of concern might cause people to fail to make the effort to buckle
passive seat belts, making them cost ineffective. In State Farm, the Court
found the agency's rejection of automatic seat belts-based on the
possibility that people would detach them-arbitrary and capricious.238

and, in the absence of successful participation up front, see 5 U.S.C. § 553(c), (2) can
successfully petition to have any grotesquely unsupported rule modified, see 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(e) and cases cited supra note I 54, and (3) for fully informal adjudications, the Court
views Congress as having determined that the stakes are so low that no one is entitled to
notice of the issues before the agency or any right to present views.
233. 463 u.s. 29 (1983).
234. /d. at 46, 51-54.
235. /d. at 56.
236. /d. at 54.
237. /d.
238. 463 u.s. 29, 51-54 (1983).
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The Court noted that, in this context, it would appear that inertia might well
operate, but this time in favor of the effectiveness of the proposed
device: 239 Many people might not take the trouble to detach such belts.
What was arbitrary and capricious was the agency's failure to explore this
factor, already recognized by the agency, which seemed to work against its
conclusion.
It is worth noting that the Court did not allow the challenger to explore
the inertia issue by augmenting the administrative record during judicial
review. Rather, it held that the agency's decision could not stand until the
agency satisfactorily explored such issues in a new proceeding.240 This,
of course, is the Overton Park model. Instead of fixing a defective agency
proceeding, the reviewing court struck it down, requiring the agency to act
lawfully, or not at all.
This indicates that relevant factor analysis has some real range of
operation, even if it is confined to issues raised, in some way, by materials
in the administrative record. There is a second way that relevant factor
analysis might operate without seriously violating the On the Record Rule.
Here, courts could go beyond the record, but only in the standard way they
can in on-the-record judicial proceedings: by means of judicial notice. 241
There may be factors, not discussed in the record submitted to the court by
an agency, whose relevance is so powerful and clear that a court may take
judicial notice of them as factors not analyzed. The standard is very
demanding. For a court to take judicial notice of a fact, it must find that
fact "not subject to reasonable dispute."242 The "fact," in relevant factor
analysis, would be of a second order, not the correctness of some
proposition, but its nearly indisputable surface relevance--making it
demand some sort of consideration from any rational decisionmaker. For
this sort of relevant factor analysis to be reasonably limited, the "factor"
would have to appear relevant to the court on the surface of things, not
only after considering technical arguments.
Where such an obviously huge gaffe has occurred, it may well be
possible to avoid speaking of an exception to the On the Record Rule.
Under such circumstances, it is more likely that the agency actually
considered such a major and salient factor, but concluded that it was not
worth more detailed consideration. Such consideration means that the factor

239. /d.
240. /d. at 56-57.
241. For a good discussion of judicial notice, see
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 210 (1995).
242. FED. R. EVID. 20l(b).

CHRISTOPHER
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is on the record in the Overton Park sense, and its rejection should have
been described in the materials submitted to the court.
Indeed, there is a respectable case to be made that the agency's failure
to consider adopting a rule mandating the use of airbags as a sole method
of passive protection-a second failure found arbitrary and capricious in
State Farm-involved this sort of judicial notice of the powerful surface
case for airbags: a case so obvious that the court could take judicial ~otice
of the powerful relevance of the unconsidered factor.
A closer examination of State Farm, however, suggests a better
explanation, and also suggests how rare such judicial notice may be, if it
is allowed at all. In State Farm, the Court seems at pains to limit the
opinion's significance by stressing that the powerful relevance of an airbag
standard was raised by the cumulative record of the agency rulemaking and
its precursors:
Nor do we broadly require an agency to consider all policy alternatives in reaching
decision. It is true that rulemaking "cannot be found wanting simply because the
agency failed to include every alternative device and thought conceivable by the
mind of man ... regardless of how uncommon or unknown that alternative may
have been ...." But the airbag is more than a policy alternative to the passive
restraint standard; it is a technological alternative within the ambit of the existing
standalrl. We hold only that given the judgment made in 1977 that airbags are an
effective and cost-beneficiallife-saving technology, the mandatory passive restraint
rule may not be abandoned without any consideration whatsoever of an
airbags-only requirement. w

The emphasized portions of the quotation are designed to stress that the
Court is not straying beyond the record in finding a failure to consider
relevant factors.
The minimalist view of informal proceedings outlined above, matched
with limitation of judicial scrutiny to the administrative record, often will
be frustrating for a court required by Overton Park to engage in careful,
probing review. There is a strong reason for such a limitation, at least
based on the assumptions which currently undergird the Court's general
philosophy of informal proceedings and judicial review. First, practical
rationality (as opposed to rationality as a model or ideal) is always what is
known as bounded rationality, or rationality acting on less information than
would be available after an infinite inquiry or even an inquiry using all
available resources. As Robert Nozick says:
. . . rationality does not require the most extensive sifting of evidence, computational exertion, and so on. That process itself has its costs, and some (r:ough)

243. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 48-51.
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decision would be made about the amount of time and energy to be put into any
particular decision or formation of belief.m

Rough seems the important word for present purposes. For any decision,
someone must structure a finite and not an unlimited inquiry. The modern
paradigm of administrative law leaves no doubt that agencies' decisions·
about where to stop the inquiry are largely final. 245 The bounded, if
extensive and hard to define, administrative record is a metaphor for
bounded rationality. Unless courts are 'to play the role of agencies, the
latter must often act on hunches about what to consider, while the former
must not disturb them except for fairly serious mistakes.
One could require an agency to give a reason, R1, for no further study
of a matter. For example, statistical material showing that drilling a test
well in the terrain in question is likely to be unyielding. But must it also
give a reason, R2, for believing R1 (an appraisal of the statistical material)
and, if so, must it give an R3 as an explanation of R2, then R4 of R3?
What is a reasonable place to allow the agency's unarticulated (and perhaps
unarticulable) "feel" to break the chain of reasons? Can one give a reason
for choosing that place? Even if so, does it make sense to require an
explanation?
The above analysis applies to relevant factors which could have been
considered at the time of agency decision, but were not sufficiently
considered. Suppose, however, that one wishes to attack an agency
decision based entirely on material which became available after the
agency's decision: for example, a scientific study completed after the
agency's decision. On the actual record, the decision passes muster, but on
the record as augmented by the report, it would not: The wages of the
Overton Park appellate review-style model, re-endorsed strongly in Vermont
Yankee, is that the decision stands.
But what of truly egregious cases in which new material becomes
available after the decision. Suppose such material proves that an agency
decision is clearly erroneous. Is it conceivable that a court is limited to the
record? Certainly it is. By analogy to pure judicial practice, a remedy· for

244. ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 125 (1993).
245. This tendency makes itself apparent in many facets of the Jaw of administrative
procedure. For example, agencies have very broad authority to bypass rulemaking
procedures by announcing a new rule in an adjudication (SEC v. Chenery, Corp., 323 U.S.
202-03 (1947)); their decisions not to bring enforcement proceedings are in most instances
not judicially reviewable (Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)) and their decisions
not to commence a rulemaking proceeding, if reviewable, are subject to extremely forgiving
judicia] 'review· (American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Lyng, 8J2 F.2d 1, 4-5 (D.C. Cir.
1987)).
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such rare cases is to ask for a rehearing of an adjudication, or the repeal or
amendment of a rule. The agency's refusal is likely to be judicially
reviewable in cases presenting the greatest injustices, or the strongest
evidence of inequities. 246

2. Extra-Record "Technical" Factors
In a number of cases, the lower federal courts have stated that a court,
perplexed by the technical nature of an agency's decision, can develop
extra-record evidence, but only as background to help it determine the
adequacy of the original record. 247 Often it is hard to determine from
these courts' opinions exactly what is meant by this. In some cases, the
technical information seems not to be new factual material, but simply
further agency explanation of the materials it considered and how it used
the materials to reason its result. 248 As analyzed above, this is completely
consistent with Overton Park and does not involve an excursion beyond the
record within the meaning of the Court's On the Record Rule. 249
The language used by these courts, however, is often consistent with
approval of excursions beyond the record to develop factual material that
supports or undercuts an agency's explanation of its decision. In some
cases, such excursions have actually been approved: 250
To a limited extent, therefore, the post-decision studies can be deemed a
clarification or an explanation of the original information before the Agency, and
for this purpose it is proper for us to consider them .... Hi! do not think it is
appropriate, howeve1; for either party to use [such material] as a new rationalization/or sustaining or attacking the agencies decision . .. it is inappropriate to rely
on the specific conclusions of these studies to show that the [agency's action was]
not the product of reasoned decision making. 251

246. American Horse, 812 F.2d at 4-5 (holding that agency decisions not to commence
rulemaking are judicially reviewable unlike most decisions not to commence enforcement
proceeding); WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (indicating that
intensity ofjudicial scrutiny in review for arbitrary and capricious agency action varies from
context to context and that review of agency's decision not to undertake rulemaking is close
to minimal end of spectrum of scrutiny).
247. See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
250. Association ofPac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1980). In this
case, the extra-record information not allowed to supplement the record was also postdecision information. !d.
251. /d.
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Is this position coherent? What does it, or could it, possibly mean for
a court, in determining the self-sufficiency of a closed record to rationally
support a decision, to be helped by extra-record materials? First, if such
extra-record materials tum out to make a difference in a court's appraisal
of a record's adequacy to support an agency's explanation of its decision,
how can it be said that the decision stood or fell based on what was before
the agency at the time of its decision? Second, if they can make no
difference, they are legally irrelevant. Because there seems to be no third
possibility, it appears that there is no justification for their admission in a
proceeding for judicial review on the ground that they are just background
which will somehow help facilitate a decision wholly based on other
materials.
Consider a case in which an agency rule is attacked based upon an
argument that the agency decisionmakers misunderstood the meaning of
technical words found in studies they relied upon, which significantly
supported their rule or order. If the agency concedes its mistake, there
should be no difficulty. The court must then assess its significance. If not,
perhaps judicial notice will work if the error is glaring on the surface and
the agency refuses to confess.
If not, then, conventionally, what remains is a decision which is not
obviously arbitrary or unreasonable given the factual record considered by
the agency and the agency's interpretation of the statutory goals. One
response, as some materials outside of administrative law suggest, might be
to allow the reviewing judge to consider the new materials. If this
approach is taken, it is important to note what has happened. Data not
before the agency. has been added to the record with the potential of
changing what was a supportable decision to an unsupportable decision or
vice versa.
There is only one plausible way to harmonize the On the Record Rule
with the use of background information not appearing in the record that
originally considered by the agency. This is to recognize that it is
inevitable that courts, called on to make judgments of reasonableness or of
rationality, bring to the task myriad bits of information which could not
possibly be reflected on the record. Some of these bits of information
define the techniques of rationality, and _some are information about the
world to which those techniques apply.
Just as sophisticated students of judicial and jury notice -recognize that
the reasoning a judge or juror applies to the record in a conventional case
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cannot and should not be a tabula rasa, this also applies to administrative
review for insufficient rationality. 252
A judge's web of beliefs about how the world works is part of the
reasoning she brings to judicial review. This operates "inconspicuously and
interstitially in the elementary process of judicial reasoning."253 Some
examples are:
... fire burns ... freeways can be crowded with fast moving cars ... deprivation
of oxygen causes death ... gravity causes things to fall ... sexual intercourse
causes pregnancy ... threats induce fear ... love or hate or jealousy can influence
behavior ... .25~

"Interstitially" and "inconspicuously" are good words to use to describe
the process of judgment where the power of syllogisms runs out. To the
extent that we simply have a rule of law which posits "if fact A then legal
result X," and, if the court articulates that fact A has been established, then
there is nothing interstitial and inconspicuous about the process of decision.
But the existence of fact A, itself, may involve many hidden, smaller-scale
judgments. For example, if fact A is that someone acted with a particular
intent, there is no precise algorithm dealing with how to establish it.
Myriad factors are relevant. A judge can make some of them ~;onspicuous
by citing them in an opinion. But some of which the judge is aware will
go unstated, and she may be unaware of others. There is a necessary gap
between the articulated premises (which point toward, but do not syllogistically determine, the judge's conclusion) and the judgment that a person
had, or did not have, a particular intent.
The decision is shaped by the structure exposed in the opinion to the
judgment, but the ·precise result is not determined exclusively by that
structure. By analogy, imagine dropping a paper airplane from a high
tower. The position of the tower-like the exposed syllogistic structure of
the opinion-puts limits on where the airplane or the decision can go. But,
in the gaps between structure and result, what determines the landing place
is influenced by too many factors to be clear from inspection, or, perhaps
ever to be articulable. It is a combination of thoughts too detailed and
fragmentary to describe in an opinion, and, in some cases, present to the
conscious mind of the judge only as an inclination to decide in one way or
another. To make a judge articulate all conscious assumptions would make
a legal opinion an expensive exercise in introspection resembling James

252. MILLER & KIRKPA1RICK, supra note 232, § 210, at 102.
253. Id § 210, at 104.
254. Id at 103.
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Joyce's Ulysses.- To make a judge unearth all unconscious influences
would require something like a psychoanalysis for each leap of judgment.
The more educated and informed they are about the world, the more
successful judges are in leaping from the articulated structures to results.
Judgments of rationality in judicial review of administrative action can
never fully take the form of a syllogism. They combine a judge's peculiar
sense of the techniques of rationality with many more facts about the world
(evaluative facts) than can appear in an opinion.
This analysis permits a better reading of the exception for technical
background information. Such information is material that a judge can
amass and allow to influence her in the gaps, but not as an explicit part of
her opinion. By definition, this is a part of the mind of a judge that we
could not, and would not want to, fully probe. A judge who is also a
trained chemist may jump the gap from the articulated premises of her
opinion to a conclusion as tp the reasonableness of an agency's conclusion-a conclusion quite different from that of a colleague who is not so
trained. Not only can we not put an end to this, but we would not want to.
Beyond this we could not stop the untrained judge from intensively reading
up on chemistry in order to make better guesses in the gaps. What neither
the trained chemist judge nor her colleague could do is to use a proposition
of chemistry as an articulated premise in her opinion, unless it was part of
the record or indisputable and included as judicially noticed.
Permitting a judge to enrich the understanding she will bring to the
inevitable, unarticulated parts of conclusions, makes some sense of the
technical background exception. Still, it seems somewhat problematic to
allow the adversary process to be used for gathering inform~tion which, by
hypothesis, does not bear directly on the issues which have and will have
crystallized in articulate form for explicit resolution. Such issues define
relevancy and, thus, normally serve to limit the scope of factfinding at trial.
Such an exception makes one wonder what the limits are on a trial as a
process of judicial education undefined by specific articulated limits.
CONCLUSION

This Article has offered a view of the Supreme Court's current
minimalist vision of (1) the agency procedures required for informal action,
(2) the real, but still comparatiyely slight, level of judicial review
appropriate for such informal proceedings, and particularly (3) the status
and place of the On the Record Rule in such a system. Although it has
been claimed that the On the Record Rule has been riddled with exceptions
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created by lower court cases, only two generaF 55 exceptions seem to have
a real following among those courts. The exception allowing a reviewing
court to consider extra-record evidence in order to determine that an agency
has appropriately considered relevant factors is an aberration and is rarely
used, though more often recited. The Supreme Court's vision of administrative law, at least since Overton Park, has been incompatible with such
an exception. More legitimate, if properly limited, is the exception
permitting consideration of extra-record materials to provide a reviewing
court with the background necessary to assess a highly technical record of
agency proceedings. Such extra-record inquiries seem almost inevitable,
given the problems of generalist courts attempting to assess the rationality
of a great many agency decisions on various technical subjects. The use
of such material must, however, be extremely limited. It cannot appear in
a reviewing court's opinion as part of the explicit reasoning. Rather, once
admitted, it may simply be used only to give a court a feel for the issues.
Why is it so clear that the Supreme Court's view of judicial review of
agency action does not permit a court to augment an agency's record with
new factual information used explicitly to evaluate the rationality of the
agency's decision? In understanding what the Supreme Court currently
requires, it seems implausible that Vermont Yankee would exempt agencies
from more stringent requirements for development of relevant factual
material/56 only to permit reviewing courts, de novo, to develop the
material that an agency missed by using less formal procedures. This
implausible view would see Vermont Yankee as implicitly repealing Overton
Park's On the Record Rule in significant ways. The notion would be that,
if a court cannot force an agency to use intensive procedures in making its
decision, the court can make up for the loss of information in the agency's
record by developing the lost information de novo in the review proceeding.
There are two reasons why this seems plainly wrong as a description of
the current system. First, neither in Vermont Yankee nor in any other case
has the Court indicated that it is abandoning or even loosening the On the
Record Rule. Second, if the Court did want to make more information
available to a reviewing court, presumably it would adjust Vermont Yankee

255. I exclude the exception for the National Environmental Policy Act cases because
it seems understood to be the product of requirements in a specific regulatory act and not
a general amendment to the Overton Park vision of review. See supra note 194 and
accompanying text.
256. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 524 ( 1978) (prohibiting courts from requiring agencies to use more procedure
than required by APA absent compelling circumstances).
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and no the On the Record Rule. Relaxing the On the Record Rule to
permit consideration of new matter on judicial review would make every
agency proceeding a potential nullity from the beginning, even though an
agency has considered all of the materials the APA requires it to consider
and even though the agency has reasoned impeccably from those materials
to its decision. Thus, from any realistic perspective, relaxing the On the
Record Rule undoes Vermont Yankee by requiring an agency to do more
than the APA requires if it wants to avoid having its decision overturned.
Most plausibly, then, both the On the Record Rule and Vermont Yankee
continue to coexist, defining a system of minimal record development, with
review for rationality confined to that record.
To describe the current "Supreme Court's vision of informal proceedings
is, of course, not to agree with it. Compelling reasons of legitimacy require
that some responsible Congress legislate to allign various agency actions on
various subjects with appropriate procedures. 257 Far too attenuated is any
connection between the original "meaning" of the half-century-old APA and
the current regulatory world, which may not be adequately dealt with by
the APA's original procedural categories. This is particularly true because
the appropriate design of administrative procedure is largely a question for
the political process.258 The issue is the optimum balance of agency
freedom versus external controls in a wide variety of proceedings involving
differing regulatory subjects and differing public and private interests.259
'Florida East Coast Railway makes nearly all rulemaking proceedings
informal under the APA, regardless of their subjects or the issues
involved. 260 Vermont Yankee generally forbids a court's requiring more
procedure than does the APA?61 While there are plausible arguments that
all rulemaking should be subject to minimalist procedures of no greater
intensity than that required by the Florida East Coast-~rmont Yankee
regime, the diversity of rulemaking activity warrants at least some
skepticism that the choice must be between fully formal proceedings under
APA sections 556 and 557 and informal proceedings as currently constitut-

257. Unfortunately, I doubt whether the current Congress is capable of mature,
deliberative politics on any large scale.
258. See Anton in Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D. C. Circuit and the Supreme
Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 405-09.
259. /d.
260. United States v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 235-38 (1973). It also,
strangely, affects the interpretation of individual agency enabling acts so that, unless they
are explicit, they are likely to be read as requiring no more procedure than does the APA.
/d. at 236-42.
261. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524.
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ed under section 553. Perhaps some should be fully formal, some slightly
less so, some still less so but as rigorous as section 553 now requires, and
some largely or entirely exempt even from the rigors of section 553 as now
construed.262
Adjudications pose similar problems, although they are somewhat
amelioratied because due process will sometimes mandate procedures more
deftly attuned to the conflicting public and private interests. Although the
Supreme Court has not spoken as to informal adjudications, the D.C.
Circuit's approach, if it ultimately becomes the national one, renders most
such proceedings informal at an agency's option. 263 As to the procedures
required under the APA in such an informal agency adjudication, there are
almost none. The Supreme Court has spoken in Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp.: there is no right to submit arguments or evidence or even to have
notice of the issues. 264 In review of informal adjudications, as well,
Vermont Yankee stops a court from requiring more of an agency, regardless
of what is at stake, short of due process protected interests.
The regime of Florida East Coast Railway and Vermont Yankee in
applying the 1946 APA to the current world resembles an attempt to stretch
a child's old clothes to fit her as an adult. Even with the best effort, new
clothes would be preferable. The issues surveyed here--what procedures
an agency must follow; what is the appropriate intensity of judicial review;
and what materials should a court consult in determining the adequacy of
an agency's inquiry and reasoning-would seem to have different answers
for different proceedings, answers not always to be found in the original
four procedural packages of the APA. For example as to agency proceedings, Justice (then Professor) Scalia proposed an APA 'that would offer
many more discrete packages of procedures than the APA currently
provides:
... I would settle for an APA that contains not merely three but ten or fifteen
basic procedural formats-an inventory large enough to provide the basis for a
whole spectrum of legislative compromises without the necessity for shopping
elsewhere. 265

262. For an earlier similar view, see Scalia, supra note 258 and infra note 265 and
accompanying text.
263. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, &73 F.2d 1477, 1479-83 (19&9)
(according Chevron deference to agency's reading of phrases in its enabling act that
determine whether it triggers APA's formal set of procedures or its informal set).
264. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 655-56 (1990).
265. Scalia, supra note 258, at 408. The reference to three sorts of procedures may seem
confusing in light of the existence of four sorts of procedures under the APA: informal
adjudication and rulemaking and formal adjudication and rulemaking. However, the APA
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This problem of an ill-fitting APA created the pressures that courts felt
before vermont Yankee to intensify agency procedure, not only to improve
agency functioning, but also to facilitate meaningful judicial review. 266
Since these pressures have been pushed back by vermont Yankee,
occasionally they have bulged out in a different form in lower court
opinions that create exceptions to the On the Record Rule. This pressure
is worth acknowledging and, indeed, taking very seriously. It must be
difficult for a well-educated, public-spirited federal judge to put her stamp
of approval (or disapproval) on agency decisions of important public policy,
while feeling terribly uncertain of exactly what she is doing. In a moment
of excess, one might even ask if this is an appropriate, task for Article III
judges. More realistically and much less dramatically, it seems fair to
observe that, if federal judges are to be forced to do such precarious guess
work, it would help for a reasonably contemporaneous Congress to tell
them with more precision how much guess work is required in a variety of
regulatory contexts.

nowhere defines a set of procedures for informal rulemaking. 5 U.S. C.§ 554 (1994). See
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 496 U.S. at 655-56 (stating that in informal adjudications,
there is no right to submit arguments or evidence or even to have notice of issues).
266. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 u.s. 519, 541-42 (1978).
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